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Morals-Based Justifications
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Our obligation is . . . not to mandate our own moral code.
1
—Lawrence v. Texas
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . .
2
—Lawrence v. Texas

INTRODUCTION
Forever, it seems, the power to shape public morality has
3
been seen as central to American governance. As one of the
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1. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (quoting Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
2. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472).
3. As Justice Harlan commented in Poe v. Ullman,
[T]he very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical
well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself
with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed, to attempt a
line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or
solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal.
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morality tradition’s chief promoters, the Supreme Court itself
has regularly endorsed and applauded government’s police
power to regulate the public’s morality along with the public’s
4
health and welfare.
How, then, can we make sense of the Court’s declaration in
5
Lawrence v. Texas that the state’s interest in preserving or
promoting a particular morality among its constituents did not
amount even to a legitimate interest to justify a Texas law
6
criminalizing sexual intimacy between consenting adults? Has
the Court unforeseeably and insupportably departed from its
tradition of approving government action in the name of moral7
ity?
8
In fact, Lawrence did no such thing. Rather than repre367 U.S. 497, 545–46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 503 (1986) (citing Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905), for the
proposition that the police power “is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare
of the people”); infra Part I.
Official action concerned with morality has traditionally reached a wide
variety of laws and policies. As Harry Clor observed regarding contemporary
morals-related government action,
Though applications of the criminal law are often at the cutting edge
of controversies over public morality, it is important to see that much
more is involved in the subject than that. Also involved are questions
about family and education: parental custody of children, criteria for
the definition of a family, the fitness of teachers in public (and private) schools, appropriate rules of behavior and disciplinary authority
in the schools, and much else.
HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON
DECENCY, LAW, AND PORNOGRAPHY 22–23 (1996).
5. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
6. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual.” (emphasis added)). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence characterized Texas’s justification for the challenged law as “promotion
of morality.” Id. at 2486 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
7. See infra Part I and accompanying text regarding government reliance
on morality to sustain official action. See also infra notes 24–31 for discussion
of the meaning of morality.
8. The Court’s ruling in Lawrence can be read most conservatively as rejecting the legitimacy of a morals-based justification only in the context of restrictions on the conduct of private, consensual, noncommercial sexual relationships between two adults. More broadly, it can be understood as rejecting
the use of morality justifications to support restrictions on unpopular groups.
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under
the Equal Protection Clause.”). Most broadly, Lawrence can be read as a com-
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senting a break with tradition, Lawrence reflected the Court’s
long-standing jurisprudential discomfort with explicit morals9
based rationales for lawmaking. Notwithstanding its ubiquiplete rejection of the legitimacy of the morality justification. See id. at 2495
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Lawrence “effectively decrees the end of all
morals legislation”).
Under any interpretation, the decision marks the first time that a majority of the Court has declared illegitimate a government’s interest in preserving
or advancing the public’s morality. Thus, this Article’s argument regarding the
Court’s steady distancing from morals justifications pertains to all interpretations of Lawrence’s morals-related holding.
9. By references to morals rationales and morality-based justifications, I
mean justifications for government action that rely expressly on moral sentiment, such as Texas’s “promotion of morality” justification in Lawrence. Although rationales that do not focus explicitly on promoting morality or deterring immorality may also reflect moral positions, as discussed infra note 37
and accompanying text, the focus here is on how the Court responds to overt
claims that official action promotes the public’s morality or gives effect to society’s moral disapproval.
Although not the subject of this Article, the ages-old discourse about the
role of law in enforcing morality supplies the backdrop against which the
discussion here takes place. As Professor Louis Henkin observed, “[t]he
relation of law to morals has been a favored preoccupation of legal
philosophers for a thousand years.” Louis Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 402 (1963).
Recent scholarship on the question whether law should give effect to morality has been voluminous and varied, and includes: CLOR, supra note 4;
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); LON
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993); H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS,
AND LAW (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY (1999); Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 15 GEO. L.J. 1871
(1997); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions
of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139 (1998); Ronald Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Chai R.
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 237 (1996); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV.
521 (1989); Jeremy Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 561 (1989); Don Welch, The State As a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 540 (1988); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic
Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989)
(reviewing PERRY, supra); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 597 (2000) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL
AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)).
For earlier scholarship on this question, see, for example, JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (Alburey Castell ed., F.S. Crofts & Co. 1947) (1859);
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tous rhetorical endorsements of government’s police power to
promote morality, it turns out that the Court has almost never
relied exclusively and overtly on morality to justify government
action. Indeed, since the middle of the twentieth century, the
Court has never relied exclusively on an explicit morals-based
justification in a majority opinion that is still good law.
This Article demonstrates and then explains this dissonance between the Supreme Court’s rhetorical tradition and
jurisprudential reality regarding morals-based justifications for
10
lawmaking. After elaborating the difficulties associated with
judicial evaluation of morals rationales, I conclude that mere
reference to morality should not suffice as a justification for
lawmaking and propose, as a partial solution, that all justifications for government action, including those reflecting particular moral concerns, be tied to demonstrable facts.
To set the stage for this Article’s arguments, Part I first
develops a brief typology of morals-based rationales for government action as they are typically formulated in litigation before the Supreme Court. The discussion in Part I, together with
the analysis in Part II, illustrates the clash between the Court’s

ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS (2d ed. 1926).
Outside of the scholarly literature, two of the best-known discussions of
the relationship between law and morality include THE WOLFENDEN REPORT
52 (Stein and Day 1963) and MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
§ 213.2, at 369–70 (Am. Law Inst. 1980) (recognizing that the criminal law
“should be concerned with conduct that is morally reprehensible or culpable”
but also that “[t]he criminal law cannot encompass all behavior that the average citizen may regard as immoral or deviate”).
10. Although lower federal courts and state courts also decide cases implicating morals-based justifications, I focus on the Supreme Court here in part
because most lower court jurisprudence regarding morality as a justification
for lawmaking has been in reaction, both positive and negative, to Bowers v.
Hardwick’s declaration of support for morality-based lawmaking. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2001) (relying on a morals justification, in light of Bowers, to uphold Alabama’s ban on sales of sex toys); Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 345–46, 353 (Ark. 2002) (invalidating Arkansas’s sodomy law on privacy and equal protection grounds and distinguishing
the reasoning of Bowers); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. App.
2001) (relying on Bowers as the basis for accepting the State’s argument that
the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law was justified by moral disapproval of
“homosexual sodomy”), rev’d by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497–503 (Ky. 1992) (distinguishing Bowers’s privacy analysis and rejecting morality justification for a Kentucky sodomy prohibition). In addition, because Lawrence has ended Bowers’s
reign as the contemporary poster case for the morals-justification argument,
the time is ripe to reconsider the Court’s actual, as opposed to rhetorical, morality jurisprudence.

GOLDBERG.3FMT

2004]

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MORALS-BASED LAWMAKING

1237

rhetorically powerful embrace of morality and its actual practice of rarely relying on explicit morals rationales, even in the
presumptive heyday of morals laws during the nineteenth century. As Part II also shows, the trend in the last half-century
has been toward reliance on anything but morality to justify restrictions.
Part III develops two explanations for this trend that are
related to the Court’s apparent concern about institutional
credibility and capacity to screen morals rationales. As the first
explanation points out, if the Court accepts a morals-based justification out of respect for majoritarian views, it cannot ensure
against the majority’s misuse of morality as a benign cover for
11
arbitrary or invidious aims, such as bias based on race or sex12
ual orientation. Deferring to the majoritarian impulse, in
other words, does not permit the Court meaningfully to screen
the morals rationales before it.
On the other hand, as the second explanation highlights, if
the Court does not defer to majoritarian sentiment, it may appear to be substituting its own views for those of the majority.
Given the highly contested nature of morality in the United

11. The equal protection and due process guarantees require this assurance under any standard of review. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
633 (1996) (“By requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to
an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the
law.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (“[T]he Due Process Clause
contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” (citation omitted)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (invalidating zoning decision because it reflected a
fear of people with mental retardation); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (striking down a provision of the federal food
stamp law because it reflected a dislike of an unpopular social group).
12. In Lawrence, for example, the Court found no legitimate state interest
to justify Texas’s Homosexual Conduct Law, implying that the morality justification was functioning as a benign-sounding cover for arbitrary or invidious
aims. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003) (“When homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the state, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and in the private spheres.”). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence similarly compared moral disapproval to a “bare desire to harm.” Id. at 2486
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
In the context of race discrimination, the Court rejected Virginia’s antimiscegenation law as impermissibly discriminatory in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Court disagreed with the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, which had sustained the law in part based on the state’s power to
legislate regarding its constituents’ morality. See id. at 7.

GOLDBERG.3FMT

1238

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1233

13

States, judicial selection of one among numerous moral positions makes the potential for the appearance of countermajori14
tarian impropriety especially likely. Without a definitive
moral code, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for the Court
to demonstrate convincingly that its use of nonmajoritarian
moral standards for screening morals-based justifications
represents anything more than the individual Justices’ personal views.
To escape this unpalatable bind, the Court has consistently
avoided relying exclusively on explicit morals rationales to sustain government action. Moreover, until Lawrence, the Court
avoided overtly rejecting morals rationales for the same credibility-related reasons.
Yet, despite the institutional tension that afflicts judicial
review of morals-based justifications for government action,
moral sentiment has not been—nor could it be—banished entirely from American law, as Part IV explains. Views about
what constitutes good and bad behavior and about the consequences of those behaviors for the well-being of society inevitably affect opinions regarding the proper scope of government
15
power. For example, we typically deem conduct harmful if it
causes tangible physical or economic harm to another person—
say, throwing a pie at a political adversary. Our association of
the pie throwing with bad behavior and cognizable harm is not
inevitable, however. Instead it reflects a moral judgment about
what constitutes harm. Rather than declaring the pie throwing
to be a tort committed against the pie recipient, we might see
the same act as a positive, self-actualizing, and nonharmful
means of expressing emotion. We might celebrate the resulting
13. There may be broad societal agreement on certain types of conduct in
interpersonal relationships, including regarding norms of courtesy and kindness, but neither the civil nor criminal law typically enforces rules regarding
these aspects of interpersonal relationships.
14. For general discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986).
15. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE
PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 15 (1998) (“We differ dramatically
in our assessments of what counts as a virtue or vice, much less their rank order.”); Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 724 (1995) (“Moral judgment is needed to determine what
count as relevant harms and to decide what are appropriate bases for legal
regulation . . . .”). For a more detailed discussion of the definition of moral sentiment and its relationship to views about human behavior and government
action, see also infra notes 24–31, 281–90 and accompanying text.
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clothing stains, too, as a fashionable expression of that emotion
rather than condemn them as an expensive injury entitled to
redress. Similarly, the response of legislators and courts to a
ban on nude dancing at bars as a means of reducing rising
16
crime rates in surrounding neighborhoods may give unexpressed effect to the moral views of lawmakers and judges regarding nude dancing. In other words, as the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, one person’s harm may be another’s de17
light.
How then can we reconcile the entangling of moral judgments and lawmaking with courts’ inability to distinguish
credibly between moral judgments and impermissible bias
masquerading as morality? Or, put another way, what can be
done to minimize the risk that moral justifications will be
abused while still allowing moral judgments to remain a part of
the law? After all, as just discussed, courts cannot rely simply
on reference to morality alone to ensure that government action
18
is nonarbitrary and free of impermissible bias. At the same
time, credibility concerns should stop most courts from offering
independent pronouncements about the validity of particular
19
moral judgments.

16. See infra notes 139–47 and accompanying text.
17. As the Court stated in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971), in
reference to the defendant’s wearing into a courthouse a jacket emblazoned
with a four-letter expletive, “it is . . . often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (“The right to free
speech . . . may not be curtailed simply because the speaker’s message may be
offensive to his audience.”); Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667,
670 (1973) (“[T]he mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to
good taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name
alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567
(1970) (“‘[U]nder our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers’ . . . .” (citation omitted)).
18. See supra note 11 (describing equal protection and due process standards).
19. Although the Court in Lawrence had no choice but to assess the morals justification proffered for the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law since morality was the primary justification proffered, it avoided direct engagement with
the law’s justification to the extent possible. See infra notes 191–96 and accompanying text. In addition, because morals support for government punishment of private sexual relations between consenting private adults has diminished considerably in recent years, the credibility risk ordinarily
associated with judicial rejection of a popular moral argument had diminished
as well. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480–81 (2003) (observing
that contemporary laws and traditions reflect “an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
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In Part V, I argue that only by steering clear of abstract,
philosophical justifications for government action and relying
instead on fact-based rationales can courts limit their exposure
to this double-edged predicament. Thus, the solution that I explore here would permit morality-inspired government action
only when it is supported by reference to empirical or otherwise
demonstrable harms. While variations on this proposal have
20
been addressed by others, I aim to add to the discussion by
showing why the factual-grounding requirement is not only
helpful but also compelled by the institutional-competence concerns reflected in the Court’s current discomfort with morals
rationales.
Before proceeding with the analysis, I first want to defend
the Article’s implicit premise that engagement with the Court’s
doctrine regarding morals-based justifications for government
action is a worthwhile enterprise. Some might argue that drawing a distinction between explicitly empirical and explicitly
moral justifications is overly formalistic because empirical justifications can be used to mask or support moral judgments. A
broader version of this critique would maintain that doctrinal
analysis itself is pointless given that doctrine can always be
21
marshaled to serve a judge’s normative preferences. To some
extent, these arguments cannot be overcome; the enterprise of
adjudication involves judgment, not mechanical application of
law to facts. As a result, the normative visions of judges will
necessarily shape not only legal analysis but also assessments
of empirical evidence.
Still, even recognizing that doctrine reflects normative
preferences, there are two ways in which attention to the
Court’s analytic framework may constrain some of the bias that
can otherwise permeate the adjudication process virtually unfettered. First, to the extent morals rationales are treated in
the doctrine as legitimate and sufficient justifications for lawmaking, they provide virtual carte blanche for government to
act in the name of morality because they can be contested only

their private lives in matters pertaining to sex,” and noting the decline in laws
that prohibit sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex).
20. See, e.g., Cicchino, supra note 9.
21. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE
L.J. 1141, 1177 (2002) (suggesting that scholars consider “jettison[ing] the
whole enterprise of taking constitutional doctrine seriously” on the grounds
that the Court develops doctrine and decides cases to achieve ideological
aims).
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22

by other moral philosophical arguments. A doctrinal shift requiring empirically-rooted justifications for government action
would make it possible to expose judicial acceptance of particular government interests to empirical as well as normative critiques.
Second, the Court’s endorsement of morals rationales may
have the effect of encouraging courts and legislators to accept
noncredible empirical justifications for government action when
a morality-based justification is also identified. Because a claim
of morality can justify virtually any legislation, criticism of a
court’s empirical analysis will not likely affect either the analysis or the outcome of a case. Without the safety net of a doctrinally preapproved morals rationale, however, judges and legislators may be less enthusiastic about risking their reputations
on acts for which the justification seems to be no more than
23
thinly veiled dislike for the actors or actions being regulated.
The definition of morality and its relationship to other
normative frameworks for judgment also warrant attention as
an introductory matter. After all, one could argue that characterizing a viewpoint as “moral” amounts to nothing more than a
rhetorical flourish atop an ordinary normative judgment. On
the other hand, a moral judgment could be said to have special
qualities distinguishing it from other normative judgments or
24
expressions of personal sentiment. The Supreme Court, moreover, has not sought to define morality even in its most enthusiastic celebrations of the morals-based police power. However,
as the next part’s detailed discussion of the cases illustrates,
the Court tends to invoke morality to refer to a systematic way
of thinking about right and wrong forms of conduct, consistent

22. Even in Lawrence, which rejected the sufficiency of the morals rationale, the Court did not explain why the proffered morals justification was insufficient other than to indicate that a tradition of moral disapproval did not suffice. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482–83 (2003); see also infra
notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
23. Of course, shifting the doctrine is no guarantee of substantive change,
as some courts will accept virtually any justification for government action
that is framed in terms of facts. A shift, however, creates an opportunity to
expose judicial reasoning to a fact-based, nonphilosophical analysis, which
might be sufficient to constrain some of the undue judicial deference accorded
to official articulations of government interests. See infra notes 293–99 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the possible benefits of a fact-based inquiry.
24. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 9, at 994–99 (analyzing the concept of a
moral position).
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25

with the term’s dictionary definition. I also use the term in
26
that general sense.
Although the discussion here focuses on morality-based
justifications, its theories and analysis would also apply to rationales for lawmaking based on tradition, social conventions,
decency, ethics, majoritarian disgust, and other similar senti27
ments. That is, to the extent these positions reflect theoretical
25. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) (defining morality as “[a] system of ideas of right
and wrong conduct”).
26. Numerous scholars, however, have sought to develop a more refined
definition of morality. Although these definitions do not pertain directly to our
enterprise of assessing the Court’s response to morality-based rationales, they
illustrate the challenges of even defining morality, let alone relying on it as a
justification for government action. See, e.g., DEVLIN, supra note 9, at 15–17
(linking morality to the views of the “right-minded person” and explaining that
to be categorized as immoral, conduct must trigger “a real feeling of reprobation” and “intolerance, indignation and disgust”); FEINBERG, supra note 9, at xi
(distinguishing a “moral harm,” which causes one to become a “worse person,”
from physical, psychological, or economic harms); PERRY, supra note 9, at 11,
138 (describing morality as a community’s vision of how to lead a good life, but
also advocating that communities “maintain a critical attitude towards the
tradition”); POSNER, supra note 9, at 4 (“Morality is the set of duties to others
(not necessarily just other people—the duties could run to animals as well, or,
importantly, to God) that are supposed to check our merely self-interested,
emotional, or sentimental reactions to serious questions of human conduct.”);
Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 479 n.1 (1989) (defining morality as including “principles about how a person should treat other
people,” and distinguishing it from ethics, which includes “convictions about
which kinds of lives are good or bad for a person to lead”); Dworkin, supra note
9, at 994 (explaining that although morality is sometimes cited to refer to a
group’s views “about the propriety of human conduct, qualities, or goals,” a
moral position is more than mere sentiment and instead is supported by reasons that are not based in “prejudice, rationalizations, matters of personal
aversion or taste, arbitrary stands, and the like.”); H.L.A. Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 958 (1957) (defining morals as a form of “social control”
and “an umbrella term sheltering many different objects requiring analysis”);
Henkin, supra note 9, at 407 n.57 (arguing that while private morals “cannot
be judged by standards of reasonableness,” society’s notions of “ordered liberty” influence morality nonetheless); see also Lawrence C. Becker, Crimes
Against Autonomy: Gerald Dworkin on the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 959, 962 (1999) (“Both [H.L.A.] Hart and his predecessor
[Mill] . . . have it in mind that morality encompasses ideals as well as duties,
permissions as well as requirements, matters that seriously affect great numbers of people as well as matters of rather transient, local importance.” (citing
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 70–74 (1963); JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 12–13 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1859))).
27. For discussion of the relationship between tradition and lawmaking,
see Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177 (1993); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
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positions about the dividing line between good and bad, they
present courts with challenges like those triggered by moralsbased rationales.
Still, the analysis here focuses directly on invocations of
morality rather than on these other potential explanations for
lawmaking because morality has been celebrated historically as
29
a legitimate basis for government action, and as a result, has
30
acquired enormous symbolic power. Tradition, on the other
hand, has received only qualified acceptance as a basis for offi31
cial action, and social conventions, disgust, and other norms
are simply not cited at all by the Court as sufficient to justify
lawmaking.
I. ENDORSEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT’S
MORAL AUTHORITY
As just highlighted, Lawrence v. Texas is the first case in
which a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected explicitly a
morality-based justification for a law on the ground that it
32
lacked legitimacy. Yet the Court’s refusal to rely on a profCOLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the
Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 (1997).
On the relationship between social norms and lawmaking, see, for example, Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967 (2003); Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485 (2003).
Recent scholarship regarding the relationship between law and emotion
includes, for example, Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal
Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Anatomy of Disgust];
Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in PASSIONS OF LAW
63 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); Toni Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in
PASSIONS OF LAW, supra, at 80; Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”:
Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in PASSIONS OF LAW, supra, at 19; Harlon L.
Dalton, “Disgust” and Punishment, 96 YALE L.J. 881 (1987) (reviewing
FEINBERG, supra note 9). And on the relationship between law and ethics, see,
for example, Dworkin, supra note 9.
28. See, e.g., WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 194 (1997)
(arguing that disgust “marks out moral matters for which we can have no
compromise”); Kahan, Anatomy of Disgust, supra note 27, at 1624 (describing
disgust as “brazenly and uncompromisingly judgmental”).
29. See infra Part I.
30. See generally MURRAY J. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS
(1964); Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of
Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1968) (analyzing the symbolically
powerful effect of legal declarations of immorality to preserve societal norms).
31. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
32. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480–81 (2003); see also Robin
West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
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fered morals rationale turns out not to be a sudden break with
earlier jurisprudence, as we will see shortly. Still, the outright
rejection of a morals rationale marks a stark shift from the
consistent rhetorical embrace of morals-based lawmaking for
the past two centuries, and that rhetorical history therefore
warrants attention. To provide context for the analysis that follows, this section will first offer a typology of morals rationales
and then sketch the contours of the surrounding jurisprudential landscape.
A. A TYPOLOGY OF MORALS RATIONALES
Morals-based justifications for lawmaking arise in a variety of ways. By grouping these appearances into four categories—pure, composite, embedded, and inert—the typology offered here is intended to provide a systematic framework for
the analysis that follows.
Morality rationales appear, at times, in their purest form
as the sole explicit rationale for government action. Bowers v.
33
Hardwick and Lawrence are prime examples of instances
where the Court considered whether morality, alone, sufficed to
34
justify challenged laws. As the discussion below demonstrates,
663 (1990) (commenting that Bowers was “arguably . . . the first time” the
Court had adopted an “explicitly conservative jurisprudential account of the
‘natural’ right of the community to define and enforce the good in law” by reference to conventional morality).
33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
34. Texas had proffered a family values rationale for the Homosexual
Conduct Law in addition to its morals-based justification, but the Court did
not consider that argument in its opinion. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484
(“[The case] does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”); Respondent’s Brief at 4, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102) (arguing that criminalizing the sexual acts of same-sex couples was “in keeping
with long-standing national tradition, and bears a rational relationship to the
worthy governmental goals of implementation of public morality and promotion of family values” (emphasis added)), available at 2003 WL 470184; see
also Brief of Amici Curiae Pro Family Law Center et al. at 6, Lawrence (No.
02-102) (“While Petitioners strenuously compare themselves to the loving heterosexual families who have existed over the course of human history, this
same history bears out the indisputable truth that monogamous marital/conjugal relationships do not ordinarily result in the transmission and
spread of deadly diseases and other economically costly effects.”), available at
2003 WL 470115; Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Arizona Policy and ProFamily Network in Support of Respondent at 15, Lawrence (No. 02-102)
(“[L]esbians and gay men do not characteristically form social units comparable to the family and sexual relationships of heterosexuals.”), available at 2003
WL 367560; Amicus Brief of the Center for Marriage Law in Support of Re-
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the Court has rarely relied solely on a pure invocation of morality and, since World War II, has never done so, with the excep35
tion of the now-reversed ruling in Bowers.
At other times, a morals rationale for government action is
relied on together with a government interest in reducing
harms or increasing benefits that are material or otherwise observable. For example, the Court’s older cases frequently sustained alcohol-related restrictions in the interests of the public
36
health and morality. We can describe these rationales as composite because the concern with morality does not stand alone
but instead appears coupled with other grounds for the exercise
of government power.
In addition to the pure and composite manifestations of
morals rationales in the Court’s decision making, the government’s interest in morality may be accepted implicitly and,
therefore, not surface in a superficial review of the Court’s decisions. For example, in numerous cases that might be thought of
as implicating morality, such as zoning limitations on adult entertainment businesses, bans on obscenity, and restrictions on
the use of foul language, morality is not even mentioned in the
majority’s analysis of the challenged measures, let alone relied
37
upon. Still, in these cases, it is conceivable, or at times even
probable, that the Court understood and accepted the government’s moral interest, even as it relied on some other justification to sustain the law. I refer to these situations as involving
an embedded morals rationale.
To a certain extent, the composite and embedded responses
to morals rationales are coextensive; for both, moral considera-

spondent at 1, Lawrence (No. 02-102) (“The Center is deeply anxious that
nothing in this Court’s decision establish precedent that would weaken the legal status of marriage and the family.”), available at 2003 WL 367565.
35. Indeed, the Court has grappled with the sufficiency of a pure morals
justification only in the rare instance that no harm-based argument has been
advanced to support the government action at issue. Thus, the distinction between moral disapproval and harm-based justifications can be said to characterize the Court’s analytic practice, even if the distinction itself is not philosophically valid to the extent that all harms ultimately reflect moral judgments.
See infra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 198 (1925) (recognizing
the “possible vicious uses” of alcohol and holding that the legislature could
suppress alcohol use “in the interest of public health and morality”); see also
infra notes 51–52, 97–103 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (sustaining a
ban on nude dancing based exclusively on secondary effects and without mention of morality in the majority opinion); see also infra Part II.C.1.
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tions might underlie a justification that is not explicitly moralsbased. For example, a public safety argument related to heightened crime rates in the vicinity of adult entertainment businesses might be offered on its own or jointly with a morals justification to support restrictions on a venue that offers shows
with nude dancers. Yet it would be naïve to think that the public safety argument, which has the appearance of being rooted
in empirical rather than moralistic concerns, might not function, in some (or many) cases, as a neutral-sounding cover for
deeper moral disapprobation of that form of adult entertainment.
Finally, morals rationales also appear in an inert form.
These are situations in which the Court touts moral sentiment
as a component of the police power or otherwise as a legitimate
and sufficient basis for government action but does not actually
38
rely on morality in its analysis. The inert appearance of morals rationales is thus unlike the composite use, because morality is not relied on formally by the Court, and unlike the em39
bedded use, because the morals rationale is explicit.
38. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 129
(1978) (including morality within the scope of a state’s police powers but sustaining application of a landmark preservation law based on a city’s power “to
enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic
features of a city”); see also infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
39. Although this typology and the analysis that follows concentrate on
the Supreme Court’s reactions to morality as a justification for government
action, the Court has also grappled with moral sentiment in other contexts,
including discussions of the moral culpability of death row defendants, the
scope of crimes of moral turpitude, and the application of good moral character
requirements, among others. These other discussions of morality also help illustrate the ways in which moral judgments remain a constant part of lawmaking. However, they typically involve assessments of whether a party possessed a particular type of blameworthiness or had committed a specified type
of misconduct and thus are not directly relevant to the project here, which focuses on the legitimacy and sufficiency of morality as a justification for government action. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 321 (2002) (ruling that the capital punishment of people with mental retardation is
unconstitutional because “disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses” show that such defendants “do not act with the level
of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct”); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989) (rejecting the argument that sixteen- and seventeen-year olds are “less morally blameworthy” for
purposes of the death penalty); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 323 n.2,
334–35 (1970) (upholding a jury-selection procedure that excluded individuals
for, inter alia, crimes of moral turpitude (citing Franklin v. South Carolina,
218 U.S. 161, 167–68 (1910) (affirming a jury-selection procedure that limited
jury participation to those of “good moral character”)); Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (“A state can require high standards of
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B. EXALTATION OF THE MORALS-BASED POLICE POWER
THROUGH THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
As this section will illustrate, the libertarian themes of individualism and liberty of contract that dominated nineteenthand early twentieth-century jurisprudence did not carry over
into the realm of morals-based lawmaking. Instead, a belief in
communitarianism functioned as the norm that guided gov40
ernment oversight of the populus, with morals concerns per41
vading the criminal law, licensing rules, and other measures.
Although historians disagree about the effect of these regula42
tions on daily life, there is no question, as the following disqualification, such as good moral character . . . before it admits an applicant to
the bar . . . .”); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) (finding that
a bar applicant’s membership in an antiestablishment political party did not
negate “good moral character”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227–32
(1951) (reviewing the use of the term “moral turpitude” in connection with
commission of fraud in general and in immigration law specifically); State v.
Horton, 248 S.E.2d 263, 264 (S.C. 1978) (concluding that a “hit and run” offense was a moral turpitude offense because it was “contrary to justice, honesty and good morals”).
40. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classical Legal Thought,
82 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1444 (1997).
41. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149–90 (1996).
42. Professor Novak has contended that “[i]f there was a transformation
in attitudes toward morality around 1776, it lay in the direction of increased
rather than decreased public attention. The postrevolutionary era witnessed
the origins of one of the most concerted and energetic moral reform movements in American history.” NOVAK, supra note 41, at 152; see also id. at 189
(“Despite historical talk of tolerance, cities of eros, Victorian compromises, or a
wholesale paradigm shift from morals to property, the regulation of public morality continued to play an absolutely central role in nineteenth-century
American life. Morals police remained one of the matter-of-fact obligations of
government in a well-regulated society.”). This interest in the public’s morals
was enabled further by the “relatively homogeneous opinion on a broad range
of morality questions” among decision makers. Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at
1440; see also David H. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early
America, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 209 (Donald Fleming & Bernard
Bailyn eds., 1971) (noting “[t]he universal acceptance of Christianity in the
American colonies” and the “accompanying harmoniousness of moral outlook”).
As a result, according to Professor Hovenkamp, a veritable “fervor to use the
state to regulate morals” took hold. See Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1439.
Others, however, have contended that the colonial-era treatment of sin as
crime began to dissipate following the American Revolution. See, e.g., JOHN
D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 157 (1988) (“In the antebellum era, Americans seemed
to be more interested in individual purification through internalized control
than in the public regulation of sexual expression.”); Flaherty, supra, at 214
(“[I]n many significant ways the colonists were not as strict as they might
have been concerning the extent to which law and morals should be identi-
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cussion illustrates, that government regularly exercised its authority with an eye to its constituents’ morals as well as their
43
physical well-being.
The police power became the conceptual focal point for
much of the discussion regarding morality during this period,
with early commentators enthusiastically reinforcing the
state’s power over morals. For example, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, a leading commentator on the police power just after the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared that “preservation of the public morals is peculiarly subject to legislative
44
supervision.” Ernst Freund, another leading expositor of the
cal.”); William E. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the
Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1967)
(tracing the shift from criminal laws based on morality to criminal laws
focused on the preservation of property); Harry N. Scheiber, Private Rights
and Public Power: American Law, Capitalism, and the Republican Polity in
Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 823 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM J.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA (1996)) (suggesting that the regulatory trend was not as
strong as Novak contended). See generally Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law
and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 27
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369 (2002) (reviewing NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED
INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA (1988) and ALISON M. PARKER, PURIFYING AMERICA: WOMEN,
CULTURAL REFORM, AND PRECENSORSHIP ACTIVISM, 1873–1933 (1997) and
discussing the historiography of censorship and sexual speech in the United
States during the nineteenth century).
43. Of course, the use of state powers to legislate morality did not begin in
the nineteenth century. In the colonial era, for example, although the power to
uphold community morality was vested in the secular rather than the religious leadership of the community, sin and crime were indistinguishable in
the eyes of lawmakers. See Flaherty, supra note 42, at 206 (“The moral law
was the official guideline for the enforcement of morals in the American colonies and the basis of the civil law itself. Sin and crime, divine law and secular
law, the moral law and the criminal law were all closely intertwined.”); id. at
208 (“The essential contribution of the moral law to the secular law was the
equation of sin and crime.”).
Laws of that era cut a broad swath, often covering not only an array of
sexual interactions but also the use of profane language and the failure to attend Sabbath services, among other restrictions. See id. at 224.
44. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATION POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 596 (1868).
Providing examples of the police power’s reach, Judge Cooley illustrated
the breadth of moral concerns a government might pursue.
[The police power grants government the power to] forbid the keeping, exhibition, or sale of indecent books or pictures, and cause their
destruction if seized; or prohibit or regulate the places of amusement
that may be resorted to for the purpose of gaming; or forbid altogether
the keeping of implements of gaming for unlawful games; or prevent
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police power writing a few decades later, described morals laws
45
as essential to our civilization. He advocated that “[t]he cultivation of moral, intellectual and aesthetic forces and interests
which advance civilization and benefit the community . . . can46
not be a matter of indifference to the state.”
1. Supreme Court Support for Restrictions on Alcohol and
Lotteries and Other Games of Chance
The Supreme Court likewise revealed its views on the relationship between law and morals through its police power jurisprudence during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Although the earliest discussions concerned
47
public health and safety, the police power quickly came to be
understood as providing carte blanche for a wide array of mor48
als legislation. Indeed, shortly after Judge Cooley set out his
the keeping and exhibition of stallions in public places. And the power
to provide for the compulsory observance of the first day of the week
is also to be referred to the same authority.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 7 (1904).
46. Id. at 9.
47. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (describing police powers as an “immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing
within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government . . . .
Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description . . . are component parts of this mass.”).
48. By 1847, the Court was speaking of the morality-based powers of
states with respect and familiarity. See, e.g., Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 504, 592 (1847) (“[I]f [an item] . . . be injurious to the health or
morals of the community, a State may, in the exercise of that great and conservative police power which lies at the foundation of its prosperity, prohibit
the sale of it.”), overruled in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); cf.
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY (2004) (explaining that, until the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, “the propriety of state laws received minimal federal scrutiny” because
neither the Bill of Rights nor most of the Constitution’s provisions applied to
the states).
In addition, although the Supreme Court first declared that the federal
government’s police powers operated only outside of state limits (e.g., the District of Columbia) in United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869), it
later relented and recognized Congress’s power to regulate in the interest of
public morals. See, e.g., Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 356–
57 (1903).
In later years, the police power has been characterized in a variety of
ways but is generally viewed as the power of government to act on behalf of its
constituents’ welfare, broadly construed to encompass, inter alia, the public’s
health, safety, and morals. See BARNETT, supra (discussing the evolution of
the police power). See generally Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The
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view of the police power’s parameters, the Court, in 1877, in
49
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, affirmed the broad scope of the police power with respect to moral regulation while upholding a
Massachusetts restriction on beer manufacture and sale.
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and
boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to
render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that
it does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property of
the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public
morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the
power to provide for these objects. They belong emphatically to that
class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus
populi suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by
50
such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise.
51

A decade later, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court also upheld a
similar Kansas law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
liquor, reasoning that the state legislature may exert its police
power “to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate
52
or needful for the protection of the public morals.”
Evolving Police Power: Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 511 (2000) (analyzing the expansion and contraction of the police
power).
49. 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
50. Id. at 33 (first emphasis added); see also id. (“[A]s a measure of police
regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any
clause of the Constitution of the United States . . . .” (citing Bartemeyer v.
Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873))). The Latin phrase salus populi suprema
lex is frequently translated to mean “the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.”
51. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
52. Id. at 661. In Mugler, the Court indicated that judicial review of exercises of the police power will consider whether “a statute purporting to have
been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety . . . [has a] substantial relation to those objects” and, if not, will invalidate the measure as “a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law.” Id.
Numerous other cases involving liquor restrictions that were decided later
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reiterated the police powers’
reach to morality as well as to public health and welfare. See, e.g., Samuels v.
McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 198 (1925) (noting that the legislature can seek to
suppress the use of liquor in the interest of public health and morality); Crane
v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 307–08 (1917) (upholding a ban on alcohol possession because it was intended to protect public morality and did so); Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia, 208 U.S. 378, 384 (1908) (finding that a state can protect
“the health, the morals, and the prosperity of the people” through liquor regulation); Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 115 (1904) (upholding a law banning
women from entering saloons and noting that the sale of liquor “is a question
of public expediency and public morality”); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343,
348 (1900) (observing that the Commerce Clause does not forbid a legislative
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In the context of government suppression of lotteries and
other games of chance, the Court in the nineteenth century
likewise applauded government regulation of morality at both
the state and federal levels. Declaring that “the suppression of
nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the
53
most important duties of Government,” the Court in the Lot54
tery Case upheld Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause to ban the use of interstate commerce for lotteries in the
interest of morality.
As a State may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its own
people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress,
for the purpose of guarding the people of the United States against
the “widespread pestilence of lotteries” and to protect the commerce
which concerns all the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery
55
tickets from one state to another.

In the related context of gaming, the Court added that no
56
evidence would be necessary to establish moral danger. As the
Court explained,
body from coming “deliberately to the conclusion that a due regard for the public safety and morals requires a suppression of the liquor traffic”); Scott v.
Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 91–92 (1897) (upholding a liquor sale restriction on, inter
alia, morals grounds); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 558, 564–65 (1891) (same);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890) (noting that the “police power
of the State is fully competent to regulate the [liquor] business—to mitigate its
evils or to suppress it entirely” for the purpose of public morality).
53. Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903) (citing
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850)).
54. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
55. Id. at 357. The Court added:
In legislating upon the subject of the traffic in lottery tickets, as carried on through interstate commerce, Congress only supplemented
the action of those States—perhaps all of them—which, for the protection of the public morals, prohibit the drawing of lotteries, as well
as the sale or circulation of lottery tickets, within their respective limits. It said, in effect, that it would not permit the declared policy of
the States, which sought to protect their people against the mischiefs
of the lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded by the agency
of interstate commerce. We should hesitate long before adjudging that
an evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate
commerce, cannot be met and crushed by the only power competent to
that end.
Id. at 357–58. For additional cases affirming government regulation of morality in the lottery context, see Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897); Stone
v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877);
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163 (1850).
56. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623, 629 (1912); see also Marvin v.
Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905) (observing that “[f]or a great many years past
gambling has been very generally in this country regarded as a vice to be prevented and suppressed in the interest of the public morals and the public welfare”).
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[t]hat the keeping of a billiard hall has a harmful tendency is a
fact requiring no proof . . . . [M]unicipal authorities [may] tak[e] legislative notice of the idleness and other evils which result from the
maintenance of a resort where it is the business of one to stimulate
57
others to play beyond what is proper for legitimate recreation.

Further reinforcing the presumption of harm, the Court
also invoked a 1672 decision by Lord Hale upholding a ban on
bowling alleys “because of the known and demoralizing ten58
dency of such places.”
2. Support for Early Sexuality Restrictions
The Court also sustained morals restrictions regarding
59
sexuality. Outside the context of polygamy, however, the
Court did not address the constitutionality of a single sexual60
ity-related prohibition in the nineteenth century. Then, in
1900, the Court upheld a New Orleans ordinance designating
the neighborhood in which a “‘public prostitute or woman noto61
riously abandoned to lewdness’” could reside. In L’Hote v. New
Orleans, the Court reinforced that states not only have the authority but also the “duty” to exercise the police power “to pro62
tect the public health and morals.” That authority, the Court
63
said, was “beyond question.”

57. Murphy, 225 U.S. at 629.
58. Id. at 630 (citing Rex v. Hall, 2 Keble, 846 (1672)).
59. One of the leading cases to address polygamy during this era was
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which never specifically mentioned morality but upheld the application of a polygamy prohibition on the
grounds that it was a permissible response to an “offence against society.” Id.
at 165.
60. Much state regulation, including laws restricting sexual conduct, was
immune from federal constitutional challenge during the nineteenth century
under the then-prevailing view that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state
action. See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding
the Takings Clause inapplicable to state action); see also Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 323–25 (1937) (describing the process of selective incorporation
of Bill of Rights guarantees against the states).
61. L’Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 588 (1900) (quoting NEW
ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE NO. 13,032 § 2 (1897)). In Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890), overruled in part on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 634 (1996), the Court upheld a polygamy-related restriction on voting rights, holding that to exempt polygamy from punishment would shock a
community’s moral judgment.
62. L’Hote, 177 U.S. at 596. But see Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138,
144, 148 (1909) (holding that Congress exceeded its power in making it a crime
to support a non-citizen to become a prostitute or to participate in immoral
behavior).
63. L’Hote, 177 U.S. at 596; see also Cosmopolitan Club v. Virginia, 208
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64

Likewise, in Hoke v. United States, the Court upheld the
White Slave Traffic Act, commonly known as the Mann Act,
which at that time prohibited transporting women and girls
across state lines for “‘the purpose of prostitution or debauch65
ery, or for any other immoral purpose.’” The Court drew a
connection between the government’s power to regulate morality in this sexuality-related context and its similar power in
other contexts.
[S]urely, if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away
from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food
and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of
66
women, and, more insistently, of girls.

As the cases of this era illustrate, the Court did not merely
U.S. 378, 384 (1908) (acknowledging a state’s “power to care for the . . . morals
of its people” through legislative enactments).
64. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
65. Id. at 317–18 (quoting 36 Stat. 825 (1910)). The Act was amended in
1986 to authorize prosecution for “any sexual activity for which any person
can be charged with a criminal offense” rather than for “debauchery” and
“immoral purpose.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 (2000).
In upholding the Mann Act, the Court affirmed that Congress, through its
interstate commerce powers, had as much authority to address moral welfare
as it had to promote material welfare. Hoke, 227 U.S. at 322 (“[I]t must be
kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the States
and those conferred on the Nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and
moral.”). The Court also, once again, affirmed the states’ power to legislate in
the name of morality: “There is unquestionably a control in the States over the
morals of their citizens . . . .” Id. at 321.
66. Id. at 322. Although the transportation at issue in Hoke was for commercial purposes, four years later, in Caminetti v. United States, the Court relied on the same moral authority embodied in the interstate commerce powers
to uphold the Mann Act’s application to men who had crossed state lines with
women for noncommercial purposes. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
491–92 (1917). Eventually, the Mann Act’s reference to “other immoral purposes” was construed to mean prostitution. See Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559,
563 (1934); see also infra note 157.
Around the same time, the Court also upheld censorship of films for the
protection of public morals. See, e.g., Mut. Film Corp. v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248
(1915). See generally Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor:
Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony
Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1992) (reviewing censorship efforts and the judicial response to them throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
The early twentieth century also saw the Supreme Court invoke the protection of public morality to justify racial segregation. See, e.g., Berea Coll. v.
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 48 (1908) (upholding a government effort to prevent
children of different races from being educated together).
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accept the proposition that government could properly concern
itself with the public’s morals. Instead, it went further, opining
with some regularity that attention to the citizenry’s morals
was among government’s most important responsibilities.
C. THE PRESUMED LEGITIMACY OF MORALS JUSTIFICATIONS
SINCE THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
From the mid-twentieth century onward, the Court continued to offer rhetorical support for morals-based laws, albeit
with less fervor than it had in earlier opinions. Three points are
noteworthy regarding the context of these contemporary endorsements of morals-based lawmaking. First, composite morals justifications came up increasingly often in connection with
prohibitions on expression, rather than on conduct, and typically were accompanied by additional state interests in the
general welfare. Second, the other major group of cases to endorse government’s morals-based lawmaking authority fits
within the inert type described above. These cases included morality in routine descriptions of government’s police powers but
did not appear to rely on it to sustain government action, as in
environmental regulation cases. Third, in contrast to the first
two types of post-war cases involving morals-based justifications, Bowers stands alone in its endorsement and acceptance
of a pure morals-based justification for lawmaking.
Turning first to the expression-related cases, we find that
67
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, a 1942 case affirming a defendant’s conviction for cursing at a police officer, laid the
groundwork for repeated endorsements of the government’s
moral authority. In sustaining the restraint on expression at
issue, the Court had observed that some words “are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter68
est in order and morality.”
This “social interest in order and morality” phrase then began to appear routinely in other cases, typically without elaboration, to support state regulation of lewd and obscene publica69
tions and performances. In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, for
67. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
68. Id. at 572.
69. The “social interest” phrase appeared in over twenty-five lead opinions
of the Court between 1949 and 2003, most, but not all, of which concerned restraints on socially undesirable speech, including symbolic speech. See, e.g.,
Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1547 (2003) (ruling that a ban on cross
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example, a majority of the Court, stressing the “‘right of the
Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society,’” upheld
the exhibition of an allegedly obscene film at an “adult” thea70
ter. In doing so, the Court reinforced the legitimacy of a legislature acting “to protect ‘the social interest in order and moral71
ity.’”
The second major category of cases to address the state’s
power to regulate morality since the mid-twentieth century includes opinions that reference moral authority in routine descriptions of the police power but do not otherwise mention morality. Zoning and environmental regulation cases are chief
among these.
In Berman v. Parker, for example, the Court reiterated the
familiar mantra regarding the police power’s coverage in a
unanimous decision that sustained governmental authority to
consider aesthetics as well as public health in asserting emi72
nent domain powers for redevelopment purposes. “Public
safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and orburning was constitutional); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383
(1992) (striking down a blanket prohibition on hate or bias-motivated speech);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (finding no First
Amendment protection for socially undesirable speech by a student in a secondary school setting); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 504 (1984) (affirming a decision against a loudspeaker manufacturer in a
product disparagement suit in which a consumer product organization
published an inaccurate, but nonmalicious, review of loudspeakers); New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982) (ruling that child pornography is beyond
First Amendment protection); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746
(1978) (upholding a federal prohibition on the daytime broadcast of sexually
explicit and offensive speech); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495
(1975) (striking down a statute that prohibited the publication of the identity
of a rape victim where information was a matter of public record); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (reversing a ruling against a
magazine publisher that knowingly mischaracterized a nonpublic figure);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21, 24 (1973) (limiting unprotected obscene
speech to, inter alia, materials that “appeal to the prurient interest in sex” and
“portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way”); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that there is no First Amendment
protection for obscene materials); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257
(1952) (sustaining a statute that criminalized libelous statements against particular groups).
70. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1973) (quoting
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). For
further discussion of the relationship of decency to morality, see infra note 131
and accompanying text.
71. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485
(affirming the government’s power to regulate obscenity)).
72. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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der—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs,”
73
the Court wrote.
But immediately following this description of the police
power, the Court suggested that none of those grounds was the
precise source of the government’s ability to exercise its power
to condemn land for redevelopment. Instead, as the Court explained, the references to public safety, health and morality
“merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit
74
it.” Thus, whatever the precise source of governmental authority to consider aesthetics as well as public health in redevelopment projects, it is different from the government’s power to
75
regulate morality.
Third, in contrast to the often terse endorsement of moralsbased lawmaking that appeared in Chaplinsky and the inert
reference to morality in routine police powers descriptions just
described, stands the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hard76
wick. As the sole case to rely purely on an explicit morals justification, Bowers offered the strongest support for the moralsbased lawmaking power in the latter half of the twentieth cen77
tury. Specifically, the Court wrote, “the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable” sufficed to justify the law’s prohibi-

73. Id. at 32.
74. Id. In elaborating on the reach of the police power, the Court also emphasized the power’s broad scope. “An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable
of complete definition.” Id.
75. As in Berman, support for government regulation of morality appears
frequently in dicta in cases challenging official restrictions on private property. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
503 (1987) (describing the police power as “‘an exercise of the sovereign right
of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general
welfare of the people, and . . . paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480 (1905))); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241
(1978) (same); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978)
(affirming “‘[t]he power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the
safety of the public’” (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887))).
76. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(2003).
77. Id. at 196.
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78

tion of oral and anal sex.
Dissenting in Lawrence, Justice Scalia pointed to Bowers to
reinforce the pervasiveness of “‘laws representing essentially
79
moral choices.’” “Countless judicial decisions and legislative
enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is ‘immoral
and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation,”
80
he wrote. Interestingly, though, Justice Scalia did not point to
a single Supreme Court decision to support his arguments but
instead cited to a smattering of lower court rulings that relied
81
on Bowers to uphold laws implicating moral judgments. The
complete absence of Supreme Court holdings reinforcing Bowers’s support for morals-based regulation further highlights
82
Bowers’s anomalous role amidst post–World War II precedent.
Yet even if Bowers stood alone in its pure reliance on a
morals justification, the array of cases described above, with
their regularized repetition of government’s moral regulatory
powers, has produced and fortified the sense of normalcy of
83
laws enacted for the purpose of controlling society’s morals.
78. Id. As many commentators noted and the Supreme Court itself later
acknowledged, the Georgia law did not single out sexual relations between
same-sex partners and, instead, prohibited oral and anal sex to anyone in the
state. See, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003) (“[T]he Georgia
statute [at issue in Bowers] prohibited [sodomy] whether or not the participants were of the same sex . . . .”); see also, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants
of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988) (analyzing the historical inaccuracy of the discussion in the majority and concurring opinions in Bowers
regarding the Georgia law and the history of regulating sodomy).
79. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers,
478 U.S. at 196).
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. Id.
82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing Bowers as the
Court’s first embrace of a purely morals-based justification for lawmaking).
83. Of course, neither the morals laws nor the Court’s rhetoric has put an
end to the behaviors they deem immoral. Not only did the laws not halt immoralities themselves, but they may also have played a role in encouraging
and broadening the reach of behaviors deemed immoral, particularly in the
area of sexuality. See Dennis, supra note 42, at 389 (observing “[t]he failure of
obscenity law to control immorality” while examining the law’s “significant
and far-reaching consequences for antebellum cultural and economic practices” including “the development of both sexual speech and markets for ‘obscene’ publications”); Flaherty, supra note 42, at 227 (“Despite their good intentions about upholding public morality, . . . immorality had been and
continued to be a significant problem.”); R.W. Roetger, The Transformation of
Sexual Morality in “Puritan” New England: Evidence from New Haven Court
Records, 1639–1698, 15 CANADIAN REV. OF AM. STUD. 243, 255 (1984) (identi-
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The Court in Bowers added force to this position by declaring
that “[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality,
and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be
84
very busy indeed.” Although many lower courts distinguished
or rejected Bowers’s support for pure morals-based restric85
tions, others, including those relied on by Justice Scalia, embraced Bowers’s argument that moral concerns alone sufficed to
86
justify government action. Whether that embrace should continue in the absence of Bowers requires us to examine the relationship between the Court’s actual reliance on morals justifications and its pro-morals regulation rhetoric. The next part
takes up this inquiry.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S MORAL DISCOMFORT
Given the near-reflexive support in the Supreme Court’s
opinions for states’ interventions to protect the public morality,
it may seem absurd even to question the Court’s commitment
fying “transformation in sexual morality . . . during the seventeenth century”
when magistrates “used their discretionary powers to enforce laws in a manner that reflected popular attitudes toward sexual misconduct” and “‘ordinary’
sex crimes ceased being prosecuted and . . . fornicators received lenient sentences precisely as their numbers swelled”). See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978)
(discussing ways in which official constraints on sexual relations shaped interest in and meaning of sexual acts).
Further, as a practical matter, scholars tend to agree that people of color,
poor people, and other marginalized populations bore the brunt of enforcement. These observations about disparate and targeted enforcement remain
consistent even where scholars disagree about the overall severity or frequency of enforcement. See, e.g., D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 42, at 86
(“In the nineteenth century, sexuality continued to serve as a powerful means
by which white Americans maintained dominance over people of other races.”);
id. at 215 (noting sterilization laws were passed “to prevent reproduction of
those whom proponents viewed as undesirable”).
84. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
85. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (invalidating Arkansas’s sodomy law); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)
(striking down Kentucky’s sodomy law); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont.
1997) (striking down Montana’s deviate sexual conduct law’s criminalization
of same-sex partners’ sexual relations); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d
250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding Tennessee’s sodomy prohibition invalid).
86. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that “[c]ountless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on
the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual
behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation” and citing several cases in support of that proposition).
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to its own rhetoric. After all, the possibility that the government’s interest in morality might not be sufficient to justify
government action had never been admitted by a majority of
the Court prior to Lawrence, let alone the possibility that the
government’s interest in morality might be illegitimate.
By taking a closer look at the range of cases involving discussions of morality and some of the debate surrounding those
cases, however, this part will demonstrate that little conviction
has existed on the Court, especially since the mid-twentieth
century, to rely on the moral authority promised to the states.
Instead, majority opinions in cases referencing and endorsing
government’s power to regulate morals have almost never relied exclusively on an explicit, pure reference to morality to uphold a law, typically choosing instead to sustain government
action based on observable societal harms. Further, even where
morals justifications held sway in certain contexts, later, similar cases reveal the majority distancing itself from those morals
rationales and relying on other grounds to uphold the challenged restriction.
A. CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN’S MORE LIMITED THEORY OF THE
POLICE POWER
Another early leading theorist of the police power provides
valuable context for this empirical argument about the Court’s
avoidance of morality-based justifications. As we saw above,
several early scholars of the police power advocated precisely
the type of broad, morals-encompassing authority for the state
that I contend the Court actually shied away from in adjudicating morals cases. Their view, however, was not held universally, even in the nineteenth century. For example, in sharp
contrast to Judge Cooley’s view that the state could respond to
violations of morality in the same manner as it would to tres88
passes and other injuries to persons or property stood the
work of Professor Christopher G. Tiedeman.

87. See Henkin, supra note 9, at 401–02 (“The authority of the state, under the Constitution, to enact ‘morals legislation’—laws reflecting some traditional morality having no authentic social purpose to protect other persons or
property—has always been assumed; it has deep roots, and it has seemed obvious and beyond question.”); id. at 413 (“[T]he right of the state to legislate in
the field of morals, to deprive the citizen of liberty or property for the sake of
accepted notions of morality, is deeply part of our law; some will argue that it
is beyond question or need for justification.”).
88. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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In his late nineteenth-century treatise, Professor Tiedeman
described the police power as simply the power of the government to establish “measures for the enforcement of the legal
89
maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.” Echoing John
Stuart Mill, who was writing around the same time, Professor
Tiedeman asserted that “[t]he object of police power is the prevention of crime, the protection of rights against the assaults of
90
others.”
Taking this argument further, Professor Tiedeman flatly
rejected morality as a basis for regulating. He wrote: “The police power of the government cannot be brought into operation
for the purpose of exacting obedience to the rules of morality,
91
and banishing vice and sin from the world.”
Perhaps anticipating opposition to his position, Professor
Tiedeman also spelled out a three-step argument supporting
his denunciation of morals laws. First, he took as “conceded by
all, that vice cannot be punished unless damage to others can
92
be shown as accruing or threatening.” He then argued that
because the connection between vice and damage is attenuated,
at best, vice cannot be shown to be the cause of damage—“[t]he
intervention of so many co-operating causes in all cases of re93
mote damage makes this a practical impossibility.” As a result, he concluded, because it is a “practical impossibility” to
prove that a vice caused harm to another, government should
not regulate conduct solely on the ground that the conduct con94
travenes prevailing morality.
89. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF
POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 150 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886). The
Latin phrase translates to “use what is yours so as not to injure another’s.”
90. Id.; see also MILL, supra note 9.
91. TIEDEMAN, supra note 89, at 150.
92. Id. at 151.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 153. In another version of the same point, Professor Tiedeman
emphasized the lack of connection between violation of moral prohibition and
injuries to the rights of another:
The moral laws can exact obedience only in foro conscientioe. The
municipal law has only to do with trespasses. It cannot be called into
play in order to save one from the evil consequences of his own vices,
for the violation of a right by the action of another must exist or be
threatened, in order to justify the interference of law. It is true that
vice always carries in its train more or less damage to others, but it is
an indirect and remote consequence; it is more incidental than consequential. At least it is so remote that very many other causes cooperate to produce the result, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to
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Although we will see some exceptions to his theory, Professor Tiedeman has turned out largely to be correct in anticipating the future of morals justifications, if not the future of all
laws that reflect moral visions. While I suggest in Part III that
engagement with pluralism, rather than difficulty with causation, is primarily responsible for pushing the Court away from
its support for morals-based rationales, Tiedeman’s observations forecast well the difficulties presented by majoritarian
morals laws.
The remainder of this section will focus on illustrating the
trend away from reliance on morals justifications by looking
first at what might be thought of as the cornerstone morals
cases of the nineteenth and early twentieth century—those
dealing with alcohol, lotteries and gaming, blasphemy, and polygamy. Then, the discussion will turn to the latter part of the
twentieth century for an in-depth exploration of trends in adult
sexual speech and expression cases, which are among the primary contemporary cases decided by the Supreme Court in
which explicit references to morality have played a role. This
section will also include discussion of developments in Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding Sunday closure laws, regulation
of sexual acts, and family recognition law, where concerns
about morals are not necessarily explicit but are inevitably in95
tegral to the underlying legislation at issue.
B. THE NON-MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CORNERSTONE
MORALITY CASES
Notwithstanding the frequent endorsement of the state’s
moral authority in nearly all police power cases decided from
96
the nineteenth century through the mid-1940s, none of these
cases rely exclusively on morality. Instead, the decisions tend
to rely at least as much on governmental responsibility for public health or physical safety as on morality, fitting them neatly
ascertain which is the controlling and real cause.
Id. at 150.
95. As illustrated above, the Court provides rhetorical support for government’s power to enforce morals laws in numerous other cases. However,
this section will limit discussion only to those cases in which a morals justification actually was at issue. Other cases, like the zoning and environmental
regulation cases that provide rhetorical reinforcement of the government’s
power to regulate the public’s morals, fall within the inert type and do not engage substantively with morals rationales. See supra notes 72–75 and
accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 47–66 and accompanying text.
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within the embedded type described earlier.
Among the cases that discuss morality in the context of the
police power, those concerning alcohol restrictions are, far and
97
away, the most numerous. But for as much as those cases
dramatize the moral threat posed by alcohol, the Court never
left the morality concern to stand alone. Instead, risks to the
public health and other secondary effects associated with alcohol consumption, such as crime, loomed at least as large as the
prospect of moral decline. In 1877, for example, when analyzing
a challenge to a Kansas prohibition law, the Court coupled dis98
cussion of alcohol’s moral dangers with concerns that “the
public health . . . and the public safety, may be endangered by
99
the general use of intoxicating drinks.” Pointing to specific
harms, the Court stated that “we cannot shut out of view . . .
the fact established by statistics accessible to every one, that
the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and crime existing in the
100
country, are in some degree at least, traceable to this evil.”
Later cases picked up this theme and put even further
stress on the harmful effects of liquor not just on morality but
101
also on the public health and material welfare. In Samuels v.
102
McCurdy, the last of the Supreme Court’s early police power
cases to address restrictions on alcohol, the Court acknowledged the “demoralizing” effect of alcohol, but it stressed
equally that the state’s power to control liquor included the
97. This can be understood, in part, because liquor regulations were
among the few types of regulations potentially subject to federal constitutional
review under Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 242 (1833), which limited
the Bill of Rights’ application to state action. See also supra note 60.
98. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); see also supra notes 51–
52 and accompanying text.
99. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662.
100. Id.
101. For example, in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890), the Court
explained that the injury to a drinker of alcohol
first falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines; in his
morals, which it weakens; and in the self-abasement which it creates.
But, as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property and general demoralization, it affects those who are immediately connected
with and dependent upon him.
Id. at 91.
Underscoring the centrality of the multiple risks alcohol posed to society,
the Court added that “[b]y the general concurrence of opinion of every civilized
and Christian community, there are few sources of crime and misery to society
equal to the dram shop, where intoxicating liquors, in small quantities, to be
drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying.” Id.
102. 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
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power “to avoid the abuses which follow in its train.”
In addition to the liquor cases, the lottery and gaming
cases represent another cornerstone of ardent judicial support
for morals legislation in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet, there too, the Supreme Court often refrained from relying exclusively on moral harms. In an observation made first
in an 1850 case upholding a Virginia law banning the sale of
lottery tickets and repeated in several subsequent lottery cases,
the Court pointed not only to the lottery’s moral dangers but
104
also to its deleterious economic effects. The lottery, it wrote,
further impoverishes those who are poor; it “preys upon the
hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and sim105
ple.” In 1905, the Court again stressed the dangers of gambling to both the public welfare and the public morals. Reflecting popular support for gambling restrictions, the Court
commented that “[f]or a great many years past gambling has
been very generally in this country regarded as a vice to be
prevented and suppressed in the interest of the public morals
106
and the public welfare.”
If we consider the Court’s analysis of gaming laws today,
we find that morality-based aims, while still present, exist
amidst an even broader array of concerns about the effects of
gambling. For example, in a case analyzing Puerto Rico’s authority to limit gambling advertisements, the Court recognized

103. Id. at 197–98.
104. Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850).
105. Id.; see also Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 356
(1903) (making the same observation as in Phalen about the lottery’s impoverishing effect); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 496 (1897) (same); Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879) (same).
106. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905). Because the Court relied on
interests in morality and public welfare in conjunction with each other, we can
conclude that the two are conceptually distinct and that concern with welfare
is not simply a restatement of the morals-based concern. In Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), the Court isolated welfare from other police powers and
described it in the following sense:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Cicchino, supra note 9, at 140–41 (“‘Public welfare’ arguments . . . assert[] that the law avoids harms or realizes goods other
than the good of eliminating or increasing the behavior or characteristic that
defines the classification the law creates—for example, health, safety, or economic prosperity.”).
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that concerns about crime, corruption, and other problems far
more visible in daily life than breaches of moral precepts supported the Commonwealth’s actions.
The Tourism Company’s brief before this Court explains the legislature’s belief that “[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety
and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of
moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering
of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of
organized crime.” These are some of the very same concerns, of
course, that have motivated the vast majority of the 50 States to prohibit casino gambling. We have no difficulty in concluding that the
Puerto Rico Legislature’s interest in the health, safety, and welfare of
107
its citizens constitutes a “substantial” governmental interest.

Given that almost every state currently allows some form of
gambling and that federal law does not categorically bar all advertisement for gambling and lotteries, we can safely conclude
that, today, the Court would not rely solely on morality to up108
hold official restrictions on a lottery.
107. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986) (citation omitted). Indeed, in explaining Puerto Rico’s authority to regulate speech regarding casinos, the Court analogized to a state’s authority to
regulate speech regarding cigarettes, alcohol, and prostitution. Id. at 346.
108. As of 1988, only two states did not permit any form of legalized gambling. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 847–48 (1988) (detailing
state laws related to minors’ participation in gambling activities). Lotteries
remain prohibited at the federal level. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509
U.S. 418 (1993). In Edge Broadcasting, the Court supplied a useful history of
federal efforts to control lotteries.
Congress has, since the early 19th century, sought to assist the States
in controlling lotteries. In 1876, Congress made it a crime to deposit
in the mails any letters or circulars concerning lotteries, whether illegal or chartered by state legislatures. This Court rejected a challenge
to the 1876 Act on First Amendment grounds in Ex parte Jackson. In
response to the persistence of lotteries, particularly the Louisiana
Lottery, Congress closed a loophole allowing the advertisement of lotteries in newspapers in the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, and this Court
upheld that Act against a First Amendment challenge in In re Rapier.
When the Louisiana Lottery moved its operations to Honduras, Congress passed the Act of Mar. 2, 1895, which outlawed the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate or foreign commerce. This Court
upheld the constitutionality of that Act against a claim that it exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in Lottery Case.
This federal antilottery legislation remains in effect. After the advent
of broadcasting, Congress extended the federal lottery control scheme
by prohibiting, in § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, the
broadcast of “any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.” In 1975, Congress amended
the statutory scheme to allow newspapers and broadcasters to advertise state-run lotteries if the newspaper is published in or the broadcast station is licensed to a State which conducts a state-run lottery.
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Polygamy cases, which constitute the third cornerstone of
early morals legislation, present more of a challenge than the
alcohol and gambling cases because the Court has so vigorously
highlighted the moral roots of the polygamy prohibition. As the
Court effused in an 1885 case considering the disfranchisement
of male voters with multiple wives, for example, monogamous
marriage of a man and woman is “the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress
109
in social and political improvement.”
Yet around the same time in another condemnation of polygamy, the Court took pains to identify not just the moral
harm but the other, more visible injuries it associated with plural marriage. Bigamy and polygamy, the Court said, “tend to
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace
110
of families, to degrade woman and to debase man.” Even fur111
ther, in Reynolds v. United States, the majority opinion never
once mentioned the word “morality,” characterizing polygamy
112
instead as an “offence [sic] against society.” Explaining that
concept, the Court focused particularly on one commentator’s
observation that “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle,
and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long ex113
ist in connection with monogamy.” The risk of polygamy, in
This exemption was enacted “to accommodate the operation of legally
authorized State-run lotteries consistent with continued Federal protection to the policies of non-lottery States.”
Id. at 421–23 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Similarly, with respect to lottery advertising, rather than prohibiting it
entirely, the federal government has reflected a state’s own preferences regarding lotteries within its advertising restrictions. Id. at 428 (“Instead of favoring either the lottery or the nonlottery State, Congress opted to support the
anti-gambling policy of a State like North Carolina . . . and [a]t the same time
it sought not to unduly interfere with the policy of a lottery sponsoring State
such as Virginia.”); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (observing that federal law does not prohibit
all advertising of gambling).
109. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
110. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890), overruled on other grounds
by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
111. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (sustaining a criminal conviction for violation of
bigamy prohibition).
112. Id. at 165.
113. Id. at 166. Interestingly, the Court conceded that the portended disastrous political consequences might not actually flow from sanction of polygamy. While endorsing the government’s authority to restrict polygamy, the
Court acknowledged that “[a]n exceptional colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without appearing to dis-

GOLDBERG.3FMT

1266

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1233

other words, was not moral debasement of the individuals involved but instead the undermining of American government.
This is not to say that the public’s morality was only a secondary concern of polygamy prohibitions. Rather, this close
look at the cases simply highlights that even assuming moral
disapproval would have been sufficient to sustain polygamy
prohibitions, the Court opted not to rely on morality alone and
instead rested on a composite justification addressing other,
114
concrete risks purportedly posed by plural marriage.
The last of the classic morals law cornerstones, blasphemy
prohibitions, has received virtually no substantive analysis by
115
the Supreme Court. Only two of the earliest cases offer an extended analysis of the government interest supporting a blasphemy prohibition, but those rely on religious reasoning that
would not be acceptable today. For example, in considering
whether a church could legally employ an English pastor in
1892, the Court’s reasoning rested largely on the nation’s embrace of Christianity:
The people of this state . . . profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, exturb the social condition of the people who surround it.” Id.
114. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (discussing the
state’s “considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the offspring of marriages from being bastardized”). Because Cleveland
v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), was a statutory interpretation case focused on whether a polygamous marriage fit within the Mann Act’s prohibition of interstate transport of women for “immoral” purposes, its exclusive focus on the immoral nature of polygamy is not directly relevant here.
Further, for the purpose of identifying the Court’s reliance on moralsbased justifications to sustain law, it bears noting that only ten majority opinions since 1950 have even mentioned the word “polygamy” and none engaged
in a substantive analysis of the reasons supporting prohibitions of polygamous
marriage. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (mentioning polygamy in the
course of distinguishing Davis, 133 U.S. at 333, from a Colorado amendment
precluding antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (noting the validation of polygamy convictions in the context of evaluating justifications for the Sunday
closure law).
115. The Court has mentioned blasphemy in eight lead opinions since 1950
and four prior to that time. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754
(1982) (noting the states’ power to punish blasphemy in a ruling upholding a
child pornography prohibition); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 n.15
(1968) (mentioning a witness’s reference to blasphemy law in a decision invalidating an evolution statute). For an insightful analysis of blasphemy jurisprudence and its relationship to First Amendment values, see generally
Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy,
and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1968).
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tremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society,
116
is a gross violation of decency and good order.

Likewise, nearly fifty years earlier, the Court explained, in the
context of a dispute regarding a trust, that “Christianity is a
part of the law, so that blasphemy can be punished, but not for
117
the purpose of invading the conscience of other persons.”
118
In addition, Cantwell v. Connecticut, which is perhaps
the closest contemporary relative of these cases, considered
whether a speaker who criticized another’s religion could be
119
prosecuted for inciting a breach of the peace. Its analysis,
however, was entirely different from the analysis used in the
two cases just discussed. In reversing the speaker’s conviction,
the Court emphasized that while government may prohibit
speech that incites violence, it may not intervene on the
120
grounds that listeners may be deeply offended. Concerns
about the preservation of a community’s religious sensibilities,
which presumably related to that community’s moral norms,
did not even appear in the Court’s reasoning, much less guide
the outcome of the case.
C. MORALS JUSTIFICATIONS IN THE POST–WORLD WAR II ERA
While the cases just discussed show that the Court did not
rely exclusively on morality even in the supposed heyday of
morals legislation, contemporary cases take the jurisprudence
even further from pure dependence on morals rationales. The
last several decades of cases bring into sharp relief that the
post–World War II Court has never relied exclusively on morality to sustain government action with the exception of the now116. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470 (1892)
(quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294 (1811)). The Court added:
The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion,
whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious
subject, is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and
blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole
community, is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution as some have strangely supposed, either
not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks
upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and for this
plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people,
and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity,
and not upon the doctrines or worship of those impostors.
Id. at 470–71 (quoting Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 295).
117. Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 154 (1844).
118. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
119. Id. at 303.
120. Id. at 308–09.
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121

discredited Bowers v. Hardwick. Although some of the cases
discussed below amass a majority for the rhetorical proposition
that moral concerns appropriately trigger government’s regulatory powers, the lack of exclusive reliance on, and affirmative
122
avoidance of, morals rationales is unmistakable.
To expose this trend, I will turn first and primarily to the
cases involving restrictions on “adult entertainment” establishments, including book stores, movie theaters, and nude
dancing establishments that offer for sale sexually explicit performances or materials. Then, to demonstrate that disenchantment with morals rationales is not limited to the adult
entertainment context, I will look to the Court’s analysis of restrictions on particular sexual acts, the cases regarding restrictions on “offensive” noncommercial speech, the “blue laws” jurisprudence, the Court’s treatment of non-nuclear family
formations, and finally, to the analysis of the morals justification in Lawrence.
1. The Sexual Entertainment Cases
Given both the moralistic terms of the public debate about
123
sexually explicit entertainment and the Court’s strong rhe124
torical support for morals-based lawmaking, the argument
that a majority of the Court has not relied exclusively on morals rationales in the last fifty years, other than in Bowers, may
be somewhat surprising. Even more surprising may be the use
121. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); see also supra notes 76–82 and accompanying
text.
122. A related trend is the disappearance of litigation before the Supreme
Court involving certain types of traditional morals regulations, like the prohibitions against lotteries and gambling, which were so heavily morality dependent in the Court’s century-old opinions. See supra notes 49–66 and accompanying text. However, the reduction in these regulations cannot
completely explain the Court’s nonreliance on morals rationales in light of morality’s continuing relevance to other contemporary restrictions.
The question whether the shifting away from morals justifications and
concomitant embrace of new, harm-based rationales amounts to more than a
semantic difference is addressed infra at notes 300–16 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 329 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted a lawmaker’s statement supporting
Erie’s ban on nude dancing establishments: “We’re not talking about nudity.
We’re not talking about the theater or art . . . . We’re talking about what is indecent and immoral . . . . We’re not prohibiting nudity, we’re prohibiting nudity when it’s used in a lewd and immoral fashion.” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
124. See supra Part I.
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here of the adult entertainment cases to illustrate that a
majority of the Court has been leaving morals-based rationales
entirely untouched. The against-the-current nature of these arguments is underscored further by Justice Scalia’s regular contention that “[o]ur society prohibits, and all human societies
have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional phrase,
125
‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral.”
It turns out, however, that the traditional presumption regarding the validity of morals-based justifications for lawmaking is not as reliable as Justice Scalia’s statement suggests. Let
126
us begin with Paris Adult Theatre, the first case decided after
the Court developed the framework that currently governs con127
stitutional analysis of obscenity restrictions. At issue in Paris
Adult Theatre was the constitutionality of an injunction prohib128
iting the showing of two allegedly obscene films. As was its
habit, the Court rhetorically affirmed the sufficiency of moralsbased rationales, referring to Chaplinsky’s determination that
a legislature can act legitimately to protect “the social interest
129
in order and morality.”
Yet the decision itself specifically disavowed reliance on
moral interests. “The issue in this context,” the Court wrote,
“goes beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers
130
the conduct depicted as ‘wrong’ or ‘sinful.’” Stressing that the
restriction of the films was not rooted in moral views, the Court
125. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia added:
In American society, such prohibitions have included, for example,
sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and sodomy. While there may be great diversity of view on
whether various of these prohibitions should exist (though I have
found few ready to abandon, in principle, all of them), there is no
doubt that, absent specific constitutional protection for the conduct
involved, the Constitution does not prohibit them simply because they
regulate “morality.”
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (endorsing the government’s power to encourage “good
morals”).
126. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
127. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing the
framework for evaluating obscenity prohibitions).
128. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 51–52.
129. Id. at 61 & n.12 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957), in turn quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
130. Id. at 69.

GOLDBERG.3FMT

1270

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1233

observed that
[t]he States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that
public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material,
has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the
public safety, or to jeopardize . . . the States’ “right . . . to maintain a
131
decent society.”

The Court’s reference to “decent society,” although left undefined, must be understood to fall outside moral concerns, given
the earlier stress on the morally neutral nature of the obscenity
law.
The Court also identified several other interests that might
legitimately support regulation of obscenity. In connection with
public safety, for example, the Court pointed to reports of “an
132
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.” In
133
addition, the Court noted the “social interest in order,” describing it as a concern with “antisocial behavior” that might
134
flow from the “crass commercial exploitation of sex.”
The next major shift away from reliance on morals justifi135
cations came in 1991 in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. Although
the Court in Barnes upheld an Indiana prohibition against nudity as applied to a nude dancing establishment, there was no
longer majority support for the proposition that a government
136
interest in “protecting societal order and morality” sufficed.
131. Id. (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
132. See id. at 58. In supporting the legitimacy of the safety and social order concerns, the Court dedicated a portion of its opinion to supporting the
state’s authority to embrace these concerns even absent empirical support for
them. Id. at 60–64.
133. Id. at 61 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485, in turn quoting Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 572).
134. Id. at 63.
135. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
136. A three-Justice plurality explained that public indecency laws, like
the one at issue in Barnes, “reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in
the nude among strangers in public places.” Id. at 568. It then concluded that
the Indiana ban on nudity “further[ed] a substantial government interest in
protecting order and morality.” Id. at 569. Justice Scalia opined that “[m]oral
opposition to nudity suppl[ied] a rational basis for its prohibition.” Id. at 580
(Scalia, J., concurring).
Earlier cases also sustained restrictions on adult entertainment theaters
on nonmoral, secondary-effects grounds. However, the governments in those
cases, unlike in Barnes, had not put the moral concerns in issue. See City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (observing that “the
City Council’s ‘predominate concerns’ were with the secondary effects of adult
theaters” (emphasis added)); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976) (analyzing the sufficiency of the city’s “interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods,” including preventing “serious problems” of crime
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Instead, Justice Souter, who provided the fifth vote to uphold
the statute, disclaimed reliance on morals rationales. He rested
his concurrence “not on the possible sufficiency of society’s
moral views to justify the limitations at issue, but on the
State’s substantial interest in combating the secondary effects
137
of adult entertainment establishments.” Among the secondary effects he cited were increases in prostitution, sexual assault and “other criminal activity” that the state attributed to
138
nude dancing.
139
Nearly a decade later, in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., a majority of the Court came around to Justice Souter’s position,
disregarding morals rationales entirely while upholding a public nudity restriction against a sex-related business under a
statute that was practically identical to the statute at issue in
140
Barnes. In evaluating the public indecency ordinance’s application to a business that promoted “totally nude erotic dancing
141
performed by women,” five of the seven Justices who voted to
sustain the law did not even mention morality. Instead, they
142
relied exclusively on the secondary effects of nude dancing,
accepting the city’s contention that “crime and other public
health and safety problems are caused by the presence of nude
143
dancing establishments.”
Although the city had, on its own initiative, advanced sec144
ondary-effects concerns to justify the zoning rule, this was not
a situation where morality rationales were unimaginable or entirely absent. The ordinance, after all, updated provisions of an

caused by the concentration of adult entertainment businesses in the same
neighborhood).
137. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring).
138. See id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37, Barnes (No. 90-26)).
139. 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (plurality opinion).
140. See id. at 283–84 n.* (plurality opinion) (requiring otherwise nude
dancers to wear pasties and g-strings); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569 n.2 (same).
Justice Scalia noted specifically that “[t]he city of Erie self-consciously modeled its ordinance on the public nudity statute” the Court upheld in Barnes.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 307 (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 284 (plurality opinion).
142. See id. at 300–01 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 300.
144. The ordinance’s preamble explained that the regulation was adopted
because “nude live entertainment . . . adversely impacts and threatens to impact on the public health, safety and welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects.” Id. at
290 (citation omitted).
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“‘Indecency and Immorality’ ordinance that ha[d] been on the
145
books since 1866.” As a result, the majority’s departure from
even partial rhetorical support for and reliance on moralsrelated justifications sparked a sharp rebuke from Justice
Scalia, who emphasized the continuing adequacy of morality as
a sufficient basis for legislation.
I do not feel the need, as the Court does, to identify some “secondary
effects” associated with nude dancing that the city could properly seek
to eliminate. (I am highly skeptical, to tell the truth, that the addition
of pasties and G-strings will at all reduce the tendency of establishments such as Kandyland to attract crime and prostitution, and hence
to foster sexually transmitted disease.) The traditional power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of
the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes to endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the First
146
Amendment.

As Justice Scalia himself acknowledged, the Court’s thinking
147
about morals-based justifications had changed in kind.
Thus, although the Court consistently has sustained most
adult entertainment restrictions, its jurisprudence in this area
148
has undergone a dramatic analytic shift. As early as 1973, in
145. Id.; see also supra note 123 (discussing lawmakers’ commentary regarding immorality of nude dancing).
146. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. Justice Scalia emphasized this shift most recently in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002), a case involving an ordinance
prohibiting multiple adult entertainment businesses from locating in the same
building. Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the plurality sustained the ordinance
based on the city’s express interest in addressing the “higher rates of prostitution, robbery, assaults, and thefts” in communities where adult-oriented businesses are located. See id. at 430 (plurality opinion). Likewise, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence focused entirely on the city planners’ power to regulate
sexually-oriented businesses to reduce crime. Id. at 451–53 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, however, while joining the plurality, pointedly observed that “in a case such as this our First Amendment traditions make ‘secondary effects’ analysis quite unnecessary. The Constitution does not prevent
those communities that wish to do so from regulating, or indeed entirely suppressing, the business of pandering sex.” Id. at 443–44 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. Compare Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931
(1957) (per curium) (affirming without discussion Adams Newark Theatre Co.
v. City of Newark, 126 A.2d 340 (1956), and sustaining a ban on nude burlesque productions where the city proffered morality justification), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582–83 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring)
(introducing secondary-effects doctrine in this area), and City of Erie v. Pap’s
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296–301 (2000) (plurality opinion) (outlining the plurality’s analysis on a secondary-effects basis); and id. at 310 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating his agreement with plurality’s
analytic framework). See also James S. Malloy, Recent Decision, A Content
Neutral Public Nudity Ordinance That Satisfies the O’Brien Test May Require
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Paris Adult Theatre, the majority emphasized the law’s moral
neutrality, even as it reinforced the permissibility of morals rationales to justify government action. Nearly twenty years later
in Barnes, although the state’s power to rely on morality was
touted by some of the Justices, a majority could not even be
garnered to recognize the sufficiency of morals justifications.
And now, after Erie, the Court has pushed morals rationales
completely off the table in the context of adult entertainment,
with the secondary-effects analysis embraced only by Justice
Souter in Barnes having become the preferred analytic method
for assessing the most recent round of restrictions on adult en149
tertainment.
2. Sexuality and Sexual Conduct
The Court has likewise moved away from embracing morals-based arguments as independently sufficient to justify other

Erotic Dancers to Wear G-Strings and Pasties Without Violating Their First
Amendment Right of Freedom of Expression: City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 39
DUQ. L. REV. 705, 728 (2001) (noting that early “regulations on nude dancing
were centered on social order and public morality” but that Pap’s A.M. “allow[ed] the justification to be the prevention of secondary effects such as
crime, alcohol abuse, and prostitution”).
149. The Court also has focused largely on harmful material consequences
in assessing regulation of child pornography. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982), the Court held that preventing “sexual exploitation and abuse of
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance” and explained in some detail the concrete harms that child subjects in pornographic
materials might suffer. Id. at 757–60; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
108–09, 111 (1990) (noting that “[t]he State does not rely on a paternalistic
interest in regulating Osborne’s mind . . . [but instead] hopes to destroy a
market for the exploitative use of children” while sustaining a prohibition
against possession and viewing of child pornography).
With respect to protecting children from adult-oriented pornography, the
Court has also found “a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.” Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Notably, several of the most recent challenges to restrictions on sexual entertainment have not found this child-related interest
sufficient to justify the measures at issue. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2001) (invalidating provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 notwithstanding Congress’s argument regarding
consequential material harms to children); United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (rejecting the requirement that cable television operators fully scramble or block channels offering sexually oriented programming, even though the law’s aim was to protect children from exposure);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for violating the First Amendment notwithstanding the concern that children might view sexually explicit material on the
Internet).
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restrictions related to sexuality. Most recently, of course, Lawrence firmly repudiated the Court’s glib assertion in Bowers
that morality sufficed as a legitimate government interest to
150
justify Georgia’s sodomy law. Even before Lawrence, though,
the Court began distancing itself from morals-based rationales
for government action in this context.
151
In Romer v. Evans, for example, the majority invalidated
Colorado’s constitutional amendment prohibiting government
entities from protecting lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from
152
discrimination, never once mentioning morality. Instead, in
striking down the amendment, the Court focused entirely on
the state’s freedom-of-association and conservation-of-resources
arguments and concluded that no legitimate explanation could
153
justify the breadth of the amendment’s prohibition. This
complete disregard of possible morals justifications was particularly striking in the face of Justice Scalia’s dissent, which
vigorously endorsed the moral authority of Coloradans to con154
demn homosexuality through the amendment at issue. The
amendment could have been sufficiently and legitimately supported, Justice Scalia wrote, by “the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we
155
held constitutional in Bowers.”
Of the relatively few additional cases in which the Court
156
has considered sexuality-related restrictions, most have in150. For additional discussion of Lawrence’s rejection of Bowers, see infra
notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
151. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
152. See id.
153. Id. at 635 (noting that the Court “cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective”).
154. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court “has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution . . . pronouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality . . . is evil” (internal citations omitted)). Justice
Scalia added: “The Court today, announcing that Amendment 2 ‘defies . . .
conventional [constitutional] inquiry,’ and ‘confounds [the] normal process of
judicial review,’ employs a constitutional theory heretofore unknown to frustrate Colorado’s reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral values.” Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted).
155. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. The Court has never directly considered the constitutionality of adultery laws; the last time a majority of the Court implicitly endorsed adultery
prohibitions was in Bowers. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195–96
(1986) (noting the difficulty in “limit[ing] the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual
crimes even though they are committed in the home”), overruled by Lawrence
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volved a fundamental-rights analysis and have not even con157
sidered, much less relied upon, moral justifications. For ex158
ample, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the majority opinion contained no mention of moral issues when it struck down
Connecticut’s ban on the use of contraceptives by married couv. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); cf. S. Sur. Co. v. Oklahoma, 241 U.S. 582, 586
(1916) (“Adultery is an offense against the marriage relation and belongs to
the class of subjects which each State controls in its own way.”).
The Court also has not directly analyzed the constitutionality of fornication laws, although majority opinions in several pre-Lawrence cases endorsed,
in dicta, the constitutionality of prohibitions against fornication. See, e.g.,
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973) (“[T]o say that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults
only is always beyond state regulation, is a step we are unable to take.”) (footnote omitted); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193, 196 (1964) (appearing
to accept as legitimate the government interests in “prevent[ing] breaches of
the basic concepts of sexual decency,” including promiscuous sexual conduct,
and “protect[ing] the integrity of the marriage laws of the State”). But see
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977) (“We observe
that the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether
and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [sexual] behavior among adults.”). Notwithstanding the dicta, Lawrence seems to
have signaled the death knell for fornication laws as well as sodomy prohibitions. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (stating that “[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be
but one element in a [constitutionally protected] personal bond”).
157. For instance, in a case holding that organizers of a parade could not be
required to permit a gay and lesbian group to march, the Court analyzed the
case entirely on First Amendment grounds and never once considered moral
disapproval as a possible justification for the exclusion of the gay organization.
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995).
In a different context, before the 1986 amendments to the Mann Act that
removed the prohibition on transport “for any . . . immoral purpose,” see 18
U.S.C. § 2421 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 3511,
several Mann Act cases concentrated on construing the term “immoral purpose” rather than considering whether a claimed interest in morality, standing
alone, could justify government action. However, as those cases evolved, the
Supreme Court cut back on the broad meaning it had accorded to the Mann
Act in the early part of the 1900s. See Amadio v. United States, 348 U.S. 892
(1954) (per curiam) (reversing United States v. Amadio, 215 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.
1954) and ordering the district court to dismiss the indictment as outside the
Mann Act’s purview in a case where the indictment for interstate transport for
“immoral” purposes did not include prostitution). The Court’s summary reversal in Amadio effectively overruled an earlier interpretation of the Mann Act
in Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 332–33 (1913) (holding that the
Mann Act required only an intent to tempt a victim into a life of sexual immorality). See generally DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE:
LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE MANN ACT 213, 215–16, 238 (1994) (reviewing the decline in prosecutions under the Mann Act for noncommercial immoral acts).
158. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

GOLDBERG.3FMT

1276

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1233
159

ples. Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court acknowledged the morality justification addressed by the lower
court but then immediately sidestepped it, saying that “[w]e
need not and do not . . . decide that important question in this
160
161
case.” Likewise in Roe v. Wade, the Court acknowledged
that individuals’ moral standards may shape personal views
about abortion but did not once consider morality as a possibly
162
sufficient justification for laws criminalizing abortion. Instead, the state interests acknowledged as important by the
Court were “in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical
163
standards, and in protecting potential life.”
3. Offensive Noncommercial Speech
Although most contemporary cases in which morality
might provide the sole justification for a law or policy concern
sexual conduct or commercial depictions of sexuality, as illustrated above, a few cases decided outside that context merit attention to illustrate further the Court’s reluctance to rely exclusively on morals-based rationales. Perhaps most closely
related to the cases just discussed are cases addressing the use
of sexualized language in noncommercial settings, as they arguably implicate the state’s interest in protecting constituents’
moral well-being.
Two of these cases stand out. The first involved California’s
effort to punish Paul Cohen for “‘maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . .
by . . . offensive conduct,’” because Cohen wore his notorious
“Fuck the Draft” jacket in the Los Angeles County court164
house. At issue in the case, the Court explained, was whether
California could punish Cohen “upon a more general assertion
that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may
properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabu165
lary.” Notwithstanding the widespread rhetorical reinforcement of the government’s powers to do just that through the
Court’s police powers jurisprudence, the Court did not treat
159. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
160. Id. at 452–53.
161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. See id. at 153.
163. Id. at 154.
164. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 22–23.
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morality as sufficient to justify the government’s response to
Cohen’s jacket. The Court recognized that the state’s interest in
ridding public discourse of the “unseemly expletive” might seem
reasonable but concluded that as distasteful as the word at issue might be, the First and Fourteenth Amendment forbid cen166
sorship of it.
In the other significant noncommercial language use case,
the Court spoke in the lofty terms of the schools’ responsibility
to “teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order,” but then upheld Matthew Fraser’s punishment for sexually suggestive speech during a high school assembly on harm167
based grounds rather than on a morals rationale. The majority concentrated the bulk of its discussion on the school’s au168
thority to protect vulnerable youth from developmental harm,
rather than simply relying on the school’s authority to set a
169
moral tone for the school. For example, the Court commented
166. See id. at 23–24 (stating that while “it is not so obvious that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments must be taken to disable the States from punishing public utterance of this unseemly expletive in order to maintain what
they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic . . . , that
examination and reflection will reveal the shortcomings of a contrary viewpoint” (footnote omitted)).
167. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 695–96 (1986).
Fraser’s speech nominating a candidate for student body president contained
an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.” Id. at 678. Although
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court’s judgment, he distanced himself from
the majority’s characterization of the speech, commenting that Fraser’s remarks were “no more ‘obscene,’ ‘lewd,’ or ‘sexually explicit’ than the bulk of
programs currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema.”
Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. The Court commented that its “First Amendment jurisprudence has
acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in
reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the
audience may include children.” Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 684. For example, the Court wrote, prior cases “recognize the obvious concern on the part of
parents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—
especially in a captive audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent,
or lewd speech.” Id. The Court also cited the recognized “interest in protecting
minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.” Id. “A high
school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.” Id. at 685.
169. The Court acknowledged a point made earlier in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978), that certain utterances “‘are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 685 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). However, it did not actually rely on morality in
analyzing either the speech itself or the school’s authority to punish the
speech giver. Id.
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that “[t]he speech could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on
170
the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.” Indeed, the
Court seemed troubled less by moral issues and more by misinformation about sexuality that younger students might absorb.
“Some students,” the Court noted, “were reported as bewildered
171
by the speech and the reaction of mimicry it provoked.” The
Court also stressed the particular harm it believed the speech
caused to the young women in the audience: “By glorifying
male sexuality, and in its verbal content, the speech was
172
acutely insulting to teenage girl students.” This sort of harm,
rather than a morals-based concern, appears to have prompted
the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he schools, as instruments of the
state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged
173
in by this confused boy.”
4. Sunday Closure Laws and Family Law
Cases involving Sunday closure laws, which fall even further outside the realm of sexuality regulation, also illustrate
the steady coupling of morals justifications with other bases for
government action. In an early opinion to address this type of
174
law, the Court in Hennington v. Georgia upheld a law prohib175
iting freight trains from operating on the Sabbath. Even in
that case, while recognizing the state’s interest in its constituents’ morality, the Court acknowledged that the restriction also
fell within the legislature’s power to promote the public’s wel176
fare. It characterized the law, which was challenged not as an
170. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 683.
171. Id. at 683–84.
172. Id. at 683. Again, Justice Brennan disagreed with the Court’s characterization of the harm. He wrote:
There is no evidence in the record that any students, male or female,
found the speech “insulting.” And while it was not unreasonable for
school officials to conclude that respondent’s remarks were inappropriate for a school-sponsored assembly, the language respondent used
does not even approach the sexually explicit speech regulated in
Ginsberg v. New York, or the indecent speech banned in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation.
Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
173. See id. at 683.
174. 163 U.S. 299 (1896).
175. Id. at 318.
176. See id. at 304.
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establishment of religion but rather as an impermissible interference with interstate commerce, as “an ordinary police regulation established by the State under its general power to protect the health and morals, and to promote the welfare, of its
177
people.”
178
and
When the Court decided McGowan v. Maryland
179
three related cases, it again focused on justifications other
180
than morality to sustain the Sunday closure laws. But unlike
in Hennington, its holding in these Establishment Clause cases
did not even mention morality as a potential rationale. Although the Court cited two lower court opinions that mentioned
morality in the course of analyzing the religious roots of Sun181
day closure laws, morality ultimately played no explicit role
in the Court’s decision to sustain the Maryland law at issue in
McGowan. Rather than focusing on the moral value of limiting
Sunday activities embraced in earlier rulings, the Court
stressed the variety of activities, including non-charitable
182
events, permitted on Sunday and the absence of rules requiring special comportment during the officially sanctioned day of
177. Id. at 302.
178. 366 U.S. 420 (1960).
179. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket of Mass., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys from HarrisonAllentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
180. See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 433–34 (“[D]espite the strongly religious origin of these laws, beginning before the eighteenth century, nonreligious arguments for Sunday closing began to be heard more distinctly and the
statutes began to lose some of their totally religious flavor.”).
181. See id. at 436–37 (observing that a once-a-week closure law was “‘a
rule of conduct, which the entire civilized world recognizes as essential to the
physical and moral well-being of society’”) (quoting Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal.
502 (1858) (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 449 (stating that the Sunday closure
law was analogous to a police power action concerned with “‘public health,
morals and safety’” but actually derived from the government’s power to protect “‘the peace, order, and quiet of the community’”) (quoting Hiller v. Maryland, 92 A. 842, 844 (1914)).
182. Id. at 424. The Court wrote:
[W]e find that [the law at issue] permits the Sunday sale of tobaccos
and sweets and a long list of sundry articles which we have enumerated above; we find that [a related provision] permits the Sunday operation of bathing beaches, amusement parks and similar facilities;
we find that [another provision] permits the Sunday sale of alcoholic
beverages, products strictly forbidden by predecessor statutes; we are
told that Anne Arundel County allows Sunday bingo and the Sunday
playing of pinball machines and slot machines, activities generally
condemned by prior Maryland Sunday legislation. Certainly, these
are not works of charity or necessity.
Id. at 448.
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183

rest. It then upheld the laws at issue as being legitimately
concerned with “improvement of the health, safety, recreation
184
and general well-being of our citizens.”
Finally, although few family law cases are decided at the
Supreme Court level and none has been decided in recent decades that engaged directly with morals-based justifications for
government action, trends in this area of the law bear noting
because they echo the view that courts have become increasingly ill at ease with morality-based decision making. In an extensive study of the changing role of moral discourse in family
law, Professor Carl Schneider observed “a diminution of the
law’s discourse in moral terms about the relations between
185
According to Professor Schneider, this
family members.”
trend precipitated a “transfer of many moral decisions from the
186
law to the people the law once regulated.” To take just one
example, in the child custody context, courts have increasingly
shifted toward a nexus test that requires a showing of actual
harm to a child rather than presuming harm based on parental
187
conduct or identities traditionally viewed as immoral. For in183. The Court added that “[t]hese provisions . . . seem clearly to be fashioned for the purpose of providing a Sunday atmosphere of recreation, cheerfulness, repose and enjoyment. Coupled with the general proscription against
other types of work, we believe that the air of the day is one of relaxation.” Id.
at 448. Further still, the Court observed that the statute “does talk in terms of
‘profan[ing] the Lord’s day,’ but other sections permit the activities previously
thought to be profane. Prior denunciation of Sunday drunkenness is now gone.
Contemporary concern with these statutes is evidenced by the dozen changes
made in 1959 and by the recent enactment of a majority of the exceptions.” Id.
at 448–49 (alteration in original).
Of course, the deliberately nonmoral focus of the Court’s opinion also
served to reinforce the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the laws were not religious in nature. Id. at 444 (“In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing
Laws . . . , it is not difficult to discern that as presently written and administered, most of them, at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious character.”).
184. Id. at 444. The Court added:
Numerous laws affecting public health, safety factors in industry,
laws affecting hours and conditions of labor of women and children,
week-end diversion at parks and beaches, and cultural activities of
various kinds, now point the way toward the good life for all. Sunday
Closing Laws, like those before us, have become part and parcel of
this great governmental concern wholly apart from their original purposes or connotations.
Id. at 444–45.
185. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (1985).
186. Id. at 1808.
187. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State
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stance, where lesbian and gay parents in the past were routinely denied custody or visitation on the grounds that their
sexual orientation was presumed to endanger their child’s
moral development, most states no longer permit such categori188
cally negative presumptions. Similar examples of the shift
away from morals-based analysis to consideration only of concrete harms proliferate in other types of custody disputes as
189
well as in the areas of divorce and alimony.
5. Lawrence and Morality
This pervasive reluctance to rely on morals rationales finally came to a head in Lawrence, where the Court had no
choice but to consider the state’s interest in morality since it
was Texas’s leading rationale for its Homosexual Conduct
190
Law. Yet, even there, rather than elaborate on the morality
component of the state’s police power, the Court barely analyzed the proffered morals justification. The majority opinion
mentioned moral concerns only five times and two of those
191
mentions came in descriptions of Bowers. The other three refDecision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845,
925 (2003) (describing the nexus test as the “prevailing rule”).
188. See, e.g., Patricia M. Logue, The Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents
and Their Children, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 95, 102 (2002).
[P]arental sexual orientation alone is not a basis upon which visitation is denied. And, in recent years, even states generally considered
most socially conservative on issues of homosexuality and parenting
have disclaimed any per se rule restricting custody for lesbian or gay
parents on the basis of sexual orientation alone. This trend is consistent with the generally accepted focus in custody matters on the circumstances and best interests of individual children.
Id. (footnote omitted).
This is not to suggest that lesbian and gay parents are always considered
on equal footing with nongay parents but rather that the dominant trend has
been against imposing negative categorical presumptions on account of a parent’s sexual orientation. See Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1188 (1999).
189. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 188; Schneider, supra note 185.
190. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“Texas attempts to justify its law, and the effects of the law, by
arguing that the statute satisfies rational basis review because it furthers the
legitimate government interest of the promotion of morality.”); cf. supra note
34 (discussing a family values rationale also proffered to support the Texas
statute).
191. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (“It must be acknowledged, of course,
that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.”); see also id. (quoting Bowers’s observation that “Judeao-Christian
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erences tellingly reinforce what we already know about the
Court’s disinclination to engage with morals-based arguments.
First, immediately after acknowledging the deep-rooted
“moral principles” that shape many people’s views about homosexuality, the Court asked “whether the majority may use the
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
192
through operation of the criminal law.” The Court then immediately elided its question about the sufficiency of majoritarian moral views and commented instead on its own moral
authority: “‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
193
mandate our own moral code.’”
Toward the opinion’s end, the Court finally returned to the
question whether government may act on morals rationales.
But even there, the Court seemed to resist a direct statement of
its views on the viability of morals rationales. Instead, without
paraphrasing or offering additional comment, it adopted, via
quotation, Justice Stevens’s dissenting analysis from Bowers:
“‘[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a suffi194
cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.’”
However, even Justice Stevens’s approach does not answer
fully the question whether Texas’s morals justification was inadequate. Morality, after all, is not necessarily limited to traditional majoritarian views. Conceivably, some other source, such
as moral disapproval of homosexuality derived via a natural
195
law approach, could have informed the morality rationale.
Yet the Court did not address that possibility or even mention
morality again. Instead, after reviewing the facts of the case,
the Court simply noted that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no le196
gitimate state interest.”
To the extent actions actually do speak louder than words,
the Court’s consistent disinclination to rely on, or even respond
to, morals rationales for lawmaking tells us that the days in
which mere reference to morality could justify government action are long over, if indeed they ever existed outside of Bowers.
Yet we are left, still, with the question of why the Court would
moral and ethical standards” concern “homosexual conduct”).
192. Id. at 2480.
193. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
194. Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(footnotes and citations omitted)).
195. See generally Finnis, supra note 9.
196. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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balk at accepting the very justifications celebrated by its own
rhetoric. The next part takes on that question and develops two
interrelated explanations for the Court’s avoidance of explicit
morals rationales. These theories not only illuminate some of
the challenges presented by morals-based lawmaking but also
reinforce the inevitability of the explicit morals rationale’s demise.
III. THEORIZING THE COURT’S MORAL DISCOMFORT
Out of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence come two explanations for why the Court has shied away from morals justifications in the past. The first, which I call the majoritarian impulse theory, highlights the flaws inherent in the Bowers-type
reasoning that laws can be deemed to serve moral interests by
virtue of having been popularly enacted. As I explain below,
this majoritarian argument is impermissibly circular at worst
and foreclosed by the Court’s analysis of history and tradition
at best.
The second, more powerful theory concerns institutional
competence. Specifically, I argue that if a court does not embrace the majoritarian articulation of moral interests, it may
appear to be rejecting the majority’s views in favor of judges’
personal preferences for a competing vision of the moral good.
How are judges to select plausibly among many diverse moral
frameworks other than by relying on their personal preferences? Given the diversity of moral visions held by Americans,
as highlighted by the Court’s increased engagement in the last
half-century with the pluralistic nature of American society, it
is extremely difficult, and perhaps not possible, for a court
credibly to adopt the analytic framework necessary to distinguish between legitimate and impermissible majoritarian invo197
cations of morality to justify government action.
197. Not only has disagreement increased about the morality of particular
forms of conduct but there has also been increasing respect for autonomy. See,
e.g., id. at 2480 (describing “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex”). Since autonomy also could be characterized as a moral value, the Court’s avoidance of morals rationales conceivably
could be interpreted as reflecting a judicial shift to a new moral autonomy
theory rather than as reflecting a deficiency of morality as an independent justification for lawmaking. If this shift has occurred, it may be that the difficulty
of evaluating morals rationales accounts for the change. Still, persistent rhetorical embrace of the government’s authority to promote constituents’ morality coupled with the Court’s long-standing reluctance to rely exclusively on ex-
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Taken together, these two theories confirm that the Court’s
avoidance of morals rationales as the exclusive justifications for
government action is not only reasonable but also necessary for
institutional self-preservation.
A. THE CIRCULARITY OF THE MAJORITARIAN IMPULSE
ARGUMENT
Because Bowers v. Hardwick is the only contemporary case
to sustain a challenged law based explicitly on a pure morals
justification, the Court’s opinion offers a useful starting point
for analyzing the claim that majority approval itself demonstrates the existence of a legally sufficient morals rationale. As
we will see below, whether we take the simplest version of that
argument and assume that all laws reflect moral positions or a
more nuanced version and treat only certain laws as reflecting
moral positions based on their long-standing or widespread
popular approval, the analysis does not encourage resuscitation
of reliance on morals-based justifications.
To take the simplest point first, let us consider how the
Court knew in Bowers that Georgians considered “homosexual
198
sodomy” to be “immoral and unacceptable.” No evidence had
199
been admitted regarding Georgia voters’ views. Only the text
of the statute was before the Court, and that text mentioned
200
only the prohibited acts. Yet from that information, the Court
“presumed” that Georgians had enacted into law their moral
201
disapproval of homosexuality.
plicit morals justifications suggests that the adoption of a new judicial moral
theory, even if contemplated, is far from complete. Other recent decisions, including the Court’s rejection of the right-to-die law at issue in Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and its acceptance of limitations on a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505
U.S. at 833, suggest that moral autonomy has not become the Court’s guiding
value but instead remains only one value among many competing for the
Court’s commitment.
198. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 219.
199. The case was originally dismissed by the district court for failure to
state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
200. The statute provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and
the mouth or anus of another. . . .
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. . . .
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
201. The Georgia Attorney General reinforced this point in his opening
brief, arguing that “[i]f morality is a legitimate state purpose, the identifica-
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In other words, the majority relied on the fact of the law’s
passage to establish moral disapproval of acts the law proscribed, and then relied on that moral disapproval to justify the
law’s proscription of the acts. Or, put more simply, the Court
found that the law’s passage justified a presumption that in
turn justified the law’s passage. This equation of law with
moral judgment seems to be what Justice White intended by
his comment that “[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions
of morality” and that “if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the
202
courts will be very busy indeed.”
Perhaps needless to say, especially in light of Lawrence
and the extensive literature critiquing the Bowers majority
203
opinion, the Court’s reasoning is, at least at first glance, circular and unpersuasive. If a law’s enactment is sufficient to
demonstrate moral views and if moral views are enough to sustain a law, then all laws would have to be sustained. The majoritarian impulse thus functions as a justification that swallows the entire analysis; judicial review becomes a pointless
exercise because every enacted law would bring with it a morals-based justification. If all laws reflect morality, why bother
with judicial oversight?
Further, even at the time Bowers was decided, the Court
had already rejected this self-justifying view that popular approval alone could insulate a law from legal challenge. In City
204
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for example, the Court
affirmed that “[i]t is plain that the electorate as a whole,
whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city action
violative of the Equal Protection Clause and the City may not
avoid the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or
tion of that morality, ‘the widely held values’ of the people, should be voiced
through their representatives.” Petitioner’s Brief, Bowers (No. 85-140), 1985
WL 776939, at *36.
As discussed above, the presumption regarding Georgians’ views about
homosexuality was factually inappropriate since the law did not single out
sexual acts between same-sex partners but instead prohibited anyone, regardless of sexual orientation, from engaging in the proscribed forms of contact.
See supra note 78.
202. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
203. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan Hunter, Life
After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (discussing additional critiques of Bowers).
204. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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objections of some fraction of the body politic.” Likewise, in
206
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, the Court opined
that “[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be infringed
207
simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.”
Perhaps, then, Justice White meant that the presumption
of a legally sufficient morals justification would arise not from
mere passage of a law but rather from a long-standing or widespread tradition supporting a prohibition. After all, both historically and at the time Bowers was decided, many other
208
states had in place sodomy laws similar to Georgia’s. Chief
Justice Burger’s concurrence further supports the salience of
history to the analysis by its reference to ancient proscriptions
209
against same-sex couples’ sexual intimacy. This focus on the
quality and quantity of support for a position would have the
effect of closing the morals floodgates to some degree, since not
all laws have long chronological or broad geographic pedigrees.
However, recharacterizing the existence of long-standing
prohibitions under the rubric of tradition, history, or broad
geographic support does not help the argument much. Mirroring its view that majoritarian approval alone cannot justify
government action, the Court also has affirmed that “[s]tanding
alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary viola210
tions of constitutional guarantees.” Likewise, the existence of
205. Id. at 448 (citation omitted).
206. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
207. Id. at 736–37.
208. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 n.5, 193 n.6 (1986) (referencing current and past laws criminalizing “sodomy”), overruled by Lawrence,
123 S. Ct. 2472. As the Lawrence majority observed in reviewing Bowers’s observations about the history of sodomy laws, “[t]heir historical premises are
not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.” Lawrence, 123 S. Ct.
at 2480.
209. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he proscriptions against sodomy have very ‘ancient roots.’ Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout
the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.”).
210. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (emphasis added). The
Court has made this point repeatedly. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (“‘[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the
fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries
insulates it from constitutional attack . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970))); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 210 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that either the
length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it
defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s scrutiny.”) (citing Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472; Payton
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similar laws in other jurisdictions may illustrate broad majoritarian support for the challenged action, but the fact of majoritarian support, again, cannot itself suffice to justify a law
211
unless judicial review is to be rendered virtually meaningless.
In sum, presuming moral disapproval based on the passage
of a law, as was suggested by the majority opinion in Bowers,
does not provide a means for distinguishing laws that warrant
the presumption of a legitimate and sufficient morals justification from those that do not. Indeed, the majoritarian impulse
argument embraced in Bowers actually may have reinforced
the Court’s distaste for morals-based claims precisely because
it precludes the effective screening of morals justifications that
is required for meaningful judicial review.
B. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE, PLURALISM, AND THE
INADEQUACY OF THE MORAL CODE
The remainder of this part considers whether a court could
simply rely on the “traditional power of government to foster

v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980) (“A longstanding, widespread practice is
not immune from constitutional scrutiny.”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664, 678 (1970) (“It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span
of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.”); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546–47 (1969) (“That an unconstitutional action
has been taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating
antimiscegenation law despite long tradition of prohibitions against interracial marriage); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting school segregation by race despite extensive tradition of and support for racially segregated public education); see also Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if [its foundation has] vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.”). But see Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“The short of the matter is
that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system.”).
211. In striking down a Virginia law that permitted execution of people
with mental retardation, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002), observed that national legislative trends provide the “clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.” Id. at 311–12 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). This reference to national trends as a resource for identifying contemporary values implicated in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment reinforces the salience of widespread support or disapproval for a particular provision but does
not contravene the Court’s regular observation, see supra note 210 and accompanying text, that trends alone do not suffice to justify government action.
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212

good morals (bonos mores)” rather than looking to majoritarian approval to provide moral grounding for government action. The difficulty with this position, as will be developed below, is that absent an authoritative source of bonos mores,
judges necessarily bring to bear their own moral positions any
time they review the legal sufficiency of a morals-based rationale. Although numerous scholars have long recognized that all
adjudication is affected, at some level, by individual judges’ life
213
experiences and philosophical stances, the possibility that
judges might displace legislative views on community morality
with their own brings the countermajoritarian difficulty to new
214
heights.
The risk that judges would appear to be imposing their
own views when they purport to be applying a definitive, authoritative moral framework has become especially apparent
since World War II, with a surfeit of cases before the Supreme
Court highlighting the multiplicity of moral views among the
215
American public. As these cases illustrate, the American pub212. See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
213. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (elaborating on their
political science research, which suggests that judicial outcomes are based
primarily on the personal ideologies of judges); Howard Gillman, What’s Law
Got To Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial
Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001) (commenting on
“decades of social science research . . . [that] ha[ve] demonstrated . . . that
ideological and political considerations drive decision making”); James E.
Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1677 (2003) (“[I]t seems fair to say that neither social scientists nor law professors would argue that personal preference
and ideology never influence the outcome of a case. The disagreement concerns
the magnitude of and occasions for this influence—not its existence.”); Richard
A. Posner, Appeal and Consent, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 36, 37
(“Where the Constitution is unclear, judicial review is likely to be guided by
the political prejudices and the policy preferences of the judges rather than by
the Constitution itself.”).
214. See generally BICKEL, supra note 14 (analyzing the countermajoritarian exercise of power by courts); cf. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1517 (“After
moral discourse is over, even if some parties remain unconvinced, the prevailing party’s moral beliefs attain the force and effect of law. That is why politics
is so scary.”); Barbara J. Flagg, Comment, “Animus” and Moral Disapproval: A
Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833, 851 (1998) (“State action
undertaken for moral reasons alone is the antithesis of pluralism; it evinces no
respect for the moral understanding or norms of those whom it situates as
outsiders.”).
215. See infra notes 254–77 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
illustrate the multiplicity of moral views among the American public).
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lic does not share a single, coherent vision to which courts
216
might turn when evaluating a morals rationale. Further,
even the experts in this area—moral philosophers—cannot
217
agree on what constitutes “good morals.” Whatever credibility
the Court might have possessed previously to announce moral
218
consensus on particular issues has slipped away entirely.
Consequently, a court asked to assess a morals justification
winds up either deferring to the majority’s representation of
morality or bringing to the analysis the moral vision it prefers.
The lack of an authoritative alternative to majoritarian preferences that could enable meaningful, objective assessment of
proposed moral justifications has reinforced, in turn, the
219
Court’s disinclination to rely on morality-based justifications.
The discussion here will proceed by first fleshing out arguments for the sufficiency of morals-based arguments as they
have been framed by the Court and an assortment of moral philosophers. I will then turn to the post–World War II cases to illustrate how the multiplicity of moral views in those cases has
heightened the challenge for courts charged with sorting out
legitimate moral expressions from impermissible prejudices.
1. Judicial Development of the Morality-Based Justification
As the leading advocate of moral code–based arguments on
the Court today, Justice Scalia has contended strenuously that
moral views, standing alone, should suffice to justify govern220
ment action. Although his opinions do not elaborate how government should determine that particular forms of conduct are
immoral, he has expressed absolute faith in government’s au221
thority to reinforce “traditional judgment[s].” In Pap’s A.M.,

216. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2314
(1997) (discussing “conflicting views about morality” in democratic societies).
217. See infra notes 228–53 and accompanying text.
218. As Judge Posner has observed, “there are no techniques for forging
consensus on the premises of moral inquiry and the means of deriving and
testing specific moral propositions.” POSNER, supra note 9, at 63.
219. Cf. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1517 (explaining that “the political
community” is “heterogeneous,” that “it is better, insofar as possible, to agree
to disagree, especially about the highest things,” and that “the Constitution
itself . . . forbids the government from even attempting to iron out our differences with respect to the highest things”).
220. See, e.g., Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644–48 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. See, e.g., Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 310 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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for example, he stated without citation that “the acceptability
of the traditional judgment . . . that nude public dancing itself
is immoral” should suffice to uphold a zoning restriction im222
posed on an adult entertainment establishment. Likewise,
according to Justice Scalia, “[m]oral opposition to homosexual223
ity” properly sufficed to justify the sodomy law in Bowers.
“Moral opposition to nudity supplie[d] a rational basis for its
224
prohibition” in Barnes in Justice Scalia’s view, as well.
Although Chief Justice Burger provided even less elaboration, his concurrence in Bowers similarly endorsed the propriety of government action based on moral positions. In rejecting
Michael Hardwick’s challenge to Georgia’s sodomy law, he accused Hardwick of seeking to have the Court “cast aside mil225
lennia of moral teaching.”
Thus, to the extent the positions of Justice Scalia and Chief
Justice Burger hold themselves out as relying on something
226
more than a compilation of popular dislikes, they assume
that an authoritative moral code can be ascertained and applied by courts. Professor Gerard Bradley, an advocate for the
natural law position, found some hints of this in Chief Justice
Burger’s Bowers concurrence as opposed to Justice White’s majoritarian impulse argument. He observed that “[t]he closest
any of the Bowers conservatives came to a simple statement
that sodomy is immoral was Chief Justice Burger’s concurring
observation that ‘[c]ondemnation of those practices is firmly
227
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.’” Jus222. Id.
223. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224. Id.
225. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Perhaps given
his view of the teachings’ nearly infinite existence, Chief Justice Burger did
not explain what qualified the teachings as not merely long-standing but also
distinctly moral. Or perhaps he thought his reference to long-standing laws
and a portion of Blackstone’s Commentaries had given the teachings the quality of being moral as opposed to simply popular. Although the Chief Justice
openly endorsed Judeao-Christian ethics as part of his analysis, we can presume even he would not have considered his citation to a book about Western
Christianity and homosexuality as sufficient support for a nonsectarian morals-based justification for Georgia’s law. See id. at 196–97.
226. The positions are arguably different, with Justice Scalia placing
greater emphasis on popular taste, see Barnes, 501 U.S. at 580, and Chief Justice Burger seeking to attach his analysis to a set of views outside the whims
of the majority, see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197.
227. Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review Essay of Making Men Moral, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 675 (1996) (reviewing ROBERT P.
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tice Scalia, however, for all of his defense of morals-based lawmaking, has not indicated how the code would be discerned beyond looking to the long-standing and widespread nature of
particular prohibitions.
2. Moral Philosophers on Morals-Based Rationales for
Government Action
Supplementing the Court’s efforts to stake out (or avoid) a
moral position have been moral philosophers devoted to defining the morality that governments should effectuate. Although
Richard Posner has argued categorically that the work of moral
228
philosophers is a “useless endeavor,” a brief review here of
several diverse philosophical positions regarding governmental
reliance on morality aims to illustrate a smaller point. That is,
simply, that the philosophers, through their diverse, highly developed views, reinforce the difficulty for courts that would declare as correct one particular version of morality.
Among the leading advocates for governmental reliance on
a particularized moral code have been natural law adherents
advancing the perfectionist view that the law should function
not only to prevent harm but also to “help people to establish
229
and preserve a virtuous character.” A central premise of the
natural law position is that universally valid basic human
goods can be identified and that the law, including morals230
based laws, should enable people to realize those goods. As
Robert George has explained, these goods involve “integral hu-

GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY
(1993)).
228. POSNER, supra note 9, at 17.
229. GEORGE, supra note 9, at 1. Specifically, Professor George contended,
laws prohibiting “certain powerfully seductive and corrupting vices (some sexual, some not)” can encourage virtue by:
(1) preventing the (further) self-corruption which follows from acting
out a choice to indulge in immoral conduct;
(2) preventing the bad example by which others are induced to emulate such behavior;
(3) helping to preserve the moral ecology in which people make their
morally self-constituting choices; and
(4) educating people about moral right and wrong.
Id.
230. See generally id.; Bradley, supra note 227; Finnis, supra note 9. Kent
Greenawalt has summarized the natural law position as holding that “human
law is in some sense derived from moral norms that are universally valid and
discoverable by reasoning about human nature or true human goods.” KENT
GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 161 (1987).
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man well-being and fulfillment” and are not “means to human
flourishing” but rather “they are constitutive aspects of the per231
sons whom they fulfill.”
Professor George and others have applied these theoretical
approaches to reach more specific moral positions on a variety
of issues, including the conduct that was at issue in Lawrence—
sexual relations between same-sex partners. George and John
Finnis, another leading natural law scholar, for example, both
232
served as expert witnesses in Romer v. Evans, where they
sought to establish the immorality of same-sex sexual relations
to help defend a state constitutional amendment forbidding
government entities from prohibiting discrimination against
233
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Professor Finnis argued, in
particular, that “‘homosexual acts’ are ‘morally bad’ because
‘genital activity between same-sex partners cannot actualize or
allow them to really experience any common good to which they
234
Likewise, Professor Bradley has
are jointly committed.’”
opined that “[l]aws prohibiting ‘victimless’ sexual immoralities
typically proceed from the conviction that the acts are truly
wrong, that they really damage the characters of the persons
who perform them, and that they block the path of those persons to virtue, and in specific ways offend against the common
235
good.”
Harry Clor, another moralist who has advocated governmental reliance on a specific moral code, has argued that lawmakers should concern themselves less with the virtuous character of individuals and more with the worthiness of the
community. Public morality, he wrote, “means that in principle
the civic community has a legitimate interest in discouraging
236
some ways of life and encouraging others.” In particular, he
would have morals-based lawmaking “support the efforts of
citizens to sustain a cultural milieu that reflects shared stan-

231. GEORGE, supra note 9, at 13–14. Professor George has elaborated that
the “complete” basic human good is “integral human well-being and fulfillment.” Id. at 13. This good, in turn, is comprised of “life (in a broad sense that
includes health and vitality); knowledge; play; aesthetic experience; sociability
(i.e. friendship broadly conceived); practical reasonableness; and religion.” Id.
232. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
233. LISA KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY
PEOPLE ON TRIAL 162, 166 (1998).
234. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
235. Bradley, supra note 227, at 676.
236. CLOR, supra note 4, at 103.
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237

dards of civility and decency,” and described those standards,
in turn, as implicating “notions of what is humanly respectable
238
(or degrading) conduct and what is a civilized mode of life.”
According to Professor Clor, prohibitions on pornography,
for example, are important not to prevent any material harms
that might occur to the actors or others but instead to guard
239
against “debasement of character.” “[S]tandards supportive of
monogamous family life” similarly “support certain important
240
human qualities or standards of value,” he contended.
Other moral philosophers also accept government’s role in
reinforcing morality but maintain that government should prioritize a different moral good. Liberal perfectionists, for example, agree with natural law scholars that government has a responsibility to assist people in doing good but take a different
view of how that good should be realized. Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that “[a]utonomy is a constituent element of
241
the good life.” From that, he concluded that while “it is the
242
function of government to promote morality,” it is also important that “within bounds, respect for personal autonomy re243
quires tolerating bad or evil actions.” Otherwise, his argument goes, the government potentially could risk enacting
undue restrictions on individual autonomy. According to Raz,
“there is no practical way of ensuring that the coercion [to
make morally acceptable choices] will restrict the victims’
choice of repugnant options but will not interfere with their
244
other choices.”
Like Professor Raz, Ronald Dworkin has also advocated
minimal government interference with individual decision
making, growing in part from his commitment to “equal con245
cern and respect,” which engenders a “right to moral inde246
pendence.” He has instructed that “[a] conscientious legisla237. Id. at 226.
238. Id. at 14. Clor elaborated that this ethic “is associated . . . with judgments about the worthy and the unworthy—and ultimately with ideas of the
good and the appropriate for human beings.” Id.
239. Id. at 226.
240. Id. at 17.
241. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408 (1986).
242. Id. at 415.
243. Id. at 403–04.
244. Id. at 419.
245. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180–83 (1977).
246. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 353 (1985); cf. William A.
Galston, The Legal and Political Implications of Moral Pluralism, 57 MD. L.
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tor who is told a moral consensus exists must test the credentials of that consensus” because “the principles of democracy we
follow do not call for the enforcement of the consensus, for the
belief that prejudices, personal aversions and rationalizations
do not justify restricting another’s freedom itself occupies a
247
critical and fundamental position in our popular morality.”
248
Without adequate screening, which is difficult to achieve, this
equality right is put at risk.
Others, such as David Richards, have expressed less concern with the state’s authority to instill morality and more concern with the substantive moral conclusion of many natural
law advocates that consensual sexual activity between unmarried adults, particularly same-sex partners, is inconsistent with
249
human worth and dignity. To the contrary, Professor Richards has argued, these acts fulfill basic human goods in much
the same way that Finnis, Bradley, and George advocate for
sexual relations between a man and a woman within a mar250
riage. More recently, other scholars, including Michael Sandel, Carlos Ball, and Chai Feldblum, have advanced related arguments that the sexual intimacy of lesbian and gay couples
251
has positive moral value.
REV. 236, 239 (1998) (“If . . . our moral world contains plural and conflicting
values, then the overzealous enforcement of general public principles runs the
risk of interfering with morally legitimate individual and associational practices.”).
247. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 245, at 254.
248. See id. at 254–55 (describing the legislator’s difficult task of sifting
through arguments, “trying to determine which are prejudices or rationalizations, which presuppose general principles or theories vast parts of the population could not be supposed to accept, and so on”). With respect to pornography, Professor Dworkin has commented that “it is no substitute simply to
report that the ordinary man . . . turns his thumb down on the whole business.” Id. at 258.
249. See generally David A.J. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977).
250. See id. at 1344–45 (“[A]nti-homosexuality laws violate the moral right
of people to be treated as persons with fair access to love and self-respect.”).
251. See generally Ball, supra note 9; Feldblum, supra note 9; Sandel, supra note 9. Debate also has raged over the positions of some of the earliest
moral philosophers specifically with respect to sexual relations between samesex partners. While natural law scholars maintain, for example, that Aristotle
and Plato universally condemned homosexuality, the eminent classicist Martha Nussbaum has taken the position that not only did homosexual sexual
acts take place between consenting male and female partners, but also that
those acts “‘took place with social approval and that they were regarded not as
subverting the fabric of society but rather as tending to reinforce the fabric of
society.’” See KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 233, at 164–65; see also Daniel
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Thus, even among the moral philosophers who advocate a
role for moral judgments in lawmaking, profound disagreement
252
exists about the scope and contents of those judgments. This
disagreement persists notwithstanding the view of many phi253
losophers that a philosophically correct position exists. When
coupled with the views of those who reject reliance on morals
rationales for official action, it becomes apparent that moral
philosophers, while usefully elaborating arguments, can provide limited assistance, at best, to help courts discern definitively which moral arguments are legitimate and which merely
cover for impermissible intentions.
3. A Jurisprudence of Unsettled and Contested Mores
Like the profound disagreements reflected in the work of
the moral philosophers, the competing moral views at issue in
the Court’s individual rights cases also demonstrate how difficult it would be for the Court to adopt a definitive moral
framework for evaluating morals rationales. Although the
Court has not always embraced the position of those contesting
a particular moral mandate in these cases, it unavoidably has
had to consider the existence of deeply held and divergent
moral positions on a wide range of issues.
The post–World War II cases, in particular, markedly
heightened the Court’s exposure to differing moral positions. At
that time, much of the country shifted its focus from the “labor
question” to the political and practical challenges related to the
254
country’s demographic diversity. Contributing to the change
Mendelsohn, Expert Witness and Ancient Mysteries in a Colorado Courtroom,
FRANCA
34–36
(Sept./Oct.
1996),
available
at
LINGUA
http://www.learnedhand.com/nussbaum.htm (discussing debate among classics
scholars regarding ancient philosophers views of homosexuality during trial of
Colorado’s Amendment 2).
252. Many philosophers, of course, reject the proposition that any type of
moral consideration is sufficient for lawmaking. See, e.g., HART, supra note 9;
MILL, supra note 9. As Sanford Levinson has observed, those holding this position tend to be “fundamentally dubious of the existence of a shared moral reality.” SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 78 (1988).
253. See generally Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 2424 (1992) (describing moral realist arguments that moral truths exist
and can become known by reasoned analysis).
254. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 424–25 (2001) (explaining
that the labor movement pre-1950 “sought reallocation of economic rights and
workplace entitlements” while “the new social movements of the late twentieth century sought to change the status of marginalized groups. Theirs was a
politics of recognition.”) (emphasis removed); Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at
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in judicial and popular consciousness were individuals and
groups whose views and practices had been disapproved by majoritarian lawmakers and who were demanding with increasing
255
regularity that popular sentiment not be given legal effect.
With such a varied array of moral positions being litigated
relentlessly, the idea that the Court might select one moral
framework among many and demonstrate its validity (as opposed to its reflection of the Justices’ personal moral views) is,
256
to paraphrase Justice White in Bowers, “at best facetious.”
Little possibility would exist for the Court, if it rejected the majoritarian position, to avoid the appearance of displacing the
majority’s moral philosophy in favor of its own.
Term after term, post–World War II, the Court adjudicated
numerous cases growing out of the women’s liberation movement, the sexual revolution, and other social movements that
sought to enhance various freedoms and to unsettle social mo257
res previously treated as set in stone. In the equal protection
context, for example, in the span of several decades, jurisprudence regarding the role of women shifted pointedly away from
embracing a morals-laden view of sex roles to rejecting the ex1431 (“As democracy’s participants have become more diverse, moral questions
traditionally regarded as settled often provoke widespread debate.”); cf. Steve
Fraser, The “Labor Question”, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL
ORDER: 1930–1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (discussing the
predominance of labor issues from World War I to World War II).
Of course, in some respects, American history can be described as a product of ongoing efforts of social movements to achieve change. From the time of
the American revolution, groups have been organizing and demanding that
government provide greater justice to those who live and work in this country.
See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature
and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64–69 (2001) (advocating and developing an analysis of legal history through consideration of social movements). As Reva Siegel has observed: “Over the life of the Republic, social
movements have played a significant role in shaping constitutional understandings, but constitutional theory barely recognizes the role that constitutional mobilizations play in the construction of constitutional meaning.” Reva
B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 345 (2001).
255. See generally Eskridge, supra note 254 (describing and analyzing advocacy by social movements).
256. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
257. In response, the Court began to tackle many of the issues presented by
these cases rather than glibly rejecting any challenge to majoritarian views as
it had earlier in the century. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14
(1946) (sustaining a polygamy conviction under the Mann Act); Lottery Case
(Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (rejecting a challenge to a state restriction of lotteries).
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258

istence of sex roles in most contexts.
Justice Bradley’s
259
nineteenth-century concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, with
its exposition of the “divine ordinance” and “the nature of
things” that had given rise to sex-specific social roles, famously
legalized popular presumptions about the natural aptitudes of
260
women and men. But by the mid-1970s, the easy acceptance
of majoritarian judgments about the proper roles of men and
women had gone by the wayside and, in numerous cases, the
Court carefully reviewed sex-based classifications to insure
against the very moral or otherwise “natural” roles that it had
261
embraced earlier.
Similarly, the status of nonmarital children underwent
significant transformation as the Court shifted from generalized acceptance of common law rules privileging “natural” chil262
dren over “illegitimate” children to an approach that regularly rejected classifications of children according to their
parents’ marital status. In 1968, for example, the Court allowed
nonmarital children to sue for the wrongful death of their
mother, concluding that “[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth
has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on
258. See generally Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and
the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 209 (1998) (reviewing sex discrimination litigation and analysis from the
1920s through the late 1990s).
259. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
260. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Even shortly before the midpoint
of the twentieth century, the Court hearkened back to Justice Bradley’s sentiments in Bradwell by concluding that “bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems.” Goesaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.190
(1976).
261. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982) (reviewing a sex-based classification to insure that it did not rely on “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females” or presume that
members of one sex were “innately inferior” to the other); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (invalidating sex-based distribution
scheme for military benefits and recognizing that through “romantic paternalism” toward women, “our statute books gradually became laden with gross,
stereotyped distinctions between the sexes” that gave rise to “pervasive discrimination”); cf. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (rejecting
the argument that the Privileges and Immunities Clause mandated women’s
suffrage).
262. See, e.g., Naeglin v. De Cordoba, 171 U.S. 638, 640–41 (1898)
(“[U]nder the common law illegitimate children did not inherit from their father,” but “the statutes of New Mexico introduced a new rule of inheritance:
‘Natural children, in the absence of legitimate, are heirs to their father’s estate . . . .’ In other words, under this statute, there being no legitimate children, illegitimate children inherit.”).
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the mother” and that discrimination on that basis would be “in263
vidious.”
Substantive due process doctrine likewise reveals the
Court’s awareness of the unstable, contested nature of contemporary mores. In contrast to its equal protection cases, the
Court did not directly reject the moral concerns regarding restrictions on access to contraception and abortion at issue in
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe and numerous other cases related to
264
human sexuality decided in the 1960s and 1970s. Still, these
265
“modern” cases necessarily reinforced for the Court the absence of a monolithic moral code governing the people of the
United States.
Challenges to restrictive family definitions also brought before the Court the many different ways in which people construct their lives and the widely varying moral codes that
266
might support those constructions. In Michael H. v. Gerald
267
D., for example, Justice Scalia expressed his hope that a
situation in which a married woman conceived a child with a
man other than her husband and had an intimate relationship
268
with a third man was “extraordinary.” While the Court ruled
that parental status belonged only to the husband and wife
unit, notwithstanding the facts of parentage, Michael H. nonetheless illustrates the Court’s exposure to individuals living
269
lives outside the dominant norm.
In addition to the equal protection and due process cases
that exposed the Court to changing mores, cases seeking protection for free speech rights presented even more vividly the
263. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). Levy was the first of “[t]he
modern Court’s frequent encounters with illegitimacy classifications.” GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 723 (13th ed.
1997).
264. See supra Part II.
265. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 263, at 516.
266. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating an ordinance that restricted occupancy to nuclear families rather than extended families when challenged by a woman who lived with her son and two
grandsons); United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(striking down an administrative rule that prohibited households comprised of
unrelated persons from receiving food stamps); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the application of a compulsory school attendance law to the parent of a child in an Amish society violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
267. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
268. Id. at 113.
269. Id.
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diversity of moral views in American society. Many of these
were in the form of obscenity cases, which exposed the Court to
sexual practices and values well outside any majoritarian
270
moral code. Other cases called attention to the discrimination
faced by socially subordinated groups. In 1958, in One, Inc. v.
271
Olesen, for example, the Court examined a magazine about
homosexuality that aimed, in part, “to sponsor educational programs, lectures and concerts for the aid and benefit of social
272
variants.” It then summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the magazine was “non-mailable” because it
contained “cheap pornography” and was otherwise “dirty, vul273
gar, and offensive.”
Likewise, through the free exercise cases, the Court was
exposed not only to those whose views mandated polygamous
274
marriage but also to individuals whose religious precepts em275
276
braced animal sacrifice and ingestion of peyote. Through

270. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See generally BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 192–94 (1979) (describing the Court’s practice under Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967),
of reviewing sexually explicit films that had been declared obscene).
271. 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam), rev’g 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
272. 241 F.2d at 777.
273. One, Inc., 355 U.S. 371, rev’g 241 F.2d 772, 774, 777; see also Nat’l Gay
Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, aff’d by an equally divided Court,
470 U.S. 903 (1985). Much more recently, the Court considered, in the First
Amendment context, the right of an Irish gay and lesbian organization to
march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade and the right of an openly gay man to
serve as a troop leader in the Boy Scouts. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that Massachusetts
may not require organizers of a parade to include a gay and lesbian group);
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 430 U.S. 640 (2000) (ruling that the Boy Scouts had
a First Amendment right to exclude an openly gay scout leader); cf. S.F. Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (finding that a
“Gay Olympics” event infringed the trademark of the U.S. Olympic Committee).
274. Unlike many of the other instances of exposure to individual diversity,
the Court first faced the issue of polygamy in the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
Church of The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting the free exercise defense of a
Mormon man convicted of plural marriage).
275. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (invalidating an ordinance targeted at prohibiting animal sacrifice
by adherents of Santeria).
276. See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding in the unemployment benefits context the application of a law criminalizing peyote use to individuals who ingested peyote as part of a religious ceremony in a Native American church).

GOLDBERG.3FMT

1300

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:1233

the conscientious objector cases, the Court similarly became
277
familiar with varied individual belief systems.
Once the Court began to grapple with these diverse challenges to traditional mores, the inadequacy of presuming that
all laws could be justified by reference to promotion of public
278
morality became starkly apparent. How could the Court rely
on morality as a justification for sustaining a restriction of conduct when it was wrestling each term with the absence of societal consensus on moral questions and the active shifting of
popular moral views? What expertise could the Court reasonably claim to assess the relationship between a law and its purported moral aim or to evaluate the legitimacy of the moral aim
itself? Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court, through its
actions if not its rhetoric, has sought strenuously to preserve its
credibility by avoiding engagement with morals-based ration279
ales at nearly every turn.
IV. THE NOT-SO-PUZZLING PERSISTENCE
OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
Even as the Supreme Court has eschewed reliance on explicit morality-based justifications, it has not sought to remove
all elements of moral judgment from its jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding Bowers’s flawed conclusion that statements of
majoritarian morality alone sufficed to justify Georgia’s sodomy
law, Justice White was probably correct that “[t]he law . . . is
277. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (finding the objections to warfare of three conscientious objectors to fit within the statutory
exemption from training and service in combat); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (upholding an exemption from combat service for
an individual who did not characterize his views as religious).
278. Arguably, these presentations of American diversity to the Court
should have created discomfort with morals-based justifications historically as
they have more recently. And perhaps they did, if we understand the Court’s
low level of reliance on morality even in the 1800s to signal early recognition
of the potential arbitrariness of moral code–based rationales for government
action.
279. Even the Court’s rhetoric has, at times, responded almost defensively
to the possibility that the Court might appear to be selecting among morals
rationales according to its members’ preferences. See, e.g, Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (stating that the Court was not mandating its
own moral code regarding the Homosexual Conduct Law); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (making same statement regarding
abortion regulation); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S.
35, 47 (1966) (stating that it was not the province of the courts to draw on
jurists’ moral views regarding liquor regulation), overruled on other grounds
by Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
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280

constantly based on notions of morality.”
This section will identify three levels at which moral judgments remain influential in lawmaking and adjudication, even
while the Court avoids overt reliance on morals rationales. This
discussion, coupled with the previous section’s analysis, aims to
reinforce the urgent need to facilitate meaningful review of majoritarian invocations of morality without demanding the complete eradication of morals-based interests from lawmaking.
The conclusion, which follows, offers one potential approach to
resolve this tension.
First, most broadly, normative judgments about individual
and societal well-being underlie arguments about the quality
and quantity of authority that should be accorded to both
281
courts and legislators. For example, those who believe that
the harm from restricting individual autonomy outweighs the
harm caused by the behavior of autonomous individuals might
advocate a libertarian position that would allow official inter282
vention only to prevent “harm to others.” On the other hand,
a different moral vision would support the Aristotelian view
that all branches of government should concern themselves
283
with individual moral goodness or a position that encouraged
government to balance concern for individual morality with
284
protection of individual autonomy. Even pragmatists who oppose morals-based laws on the consequentialist ground that
they present more dangers than benefits bring to that position
a normative vision regarding the relative dangers presented by
280. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence,
123 S. Ct. 2472. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 109
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that “much legislation . . . is
grounded, at least in part, on a concern with the morality of the community”)
(emphasis added). Reinforcing the difficulty in ascertaining dominant moral
views that could appropriately be the basis for regulation, Justice Brennan
observed in Paris Adult Theatre I that “the State’s interest in regulating morality by suppressing obscenity, while often asserted, remains essentially unfocused and ill defined.” Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also POSNER, supra
note 9, at 137 (“Morality is a pervasive feature of social life and is in the background of many legal principles.”).
281. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (1981) (arguing that liberalism’s support for governmental neutrality
among diverse aims does not represent a non-neutral position).
282. See MILL, supra note 9, at 82.
283. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1988).
284. See, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 245, at
180–83 (advocating limited government intervention to secure equal concern
and respect); RAZ, supra note 241 (advancing a perfectionist position).
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individual action and government oversight.
Second, and more narrowly, moral judgments help determine whether and how society should respond to acts that are
viewed as having a negative impact on constitutive conditions
or other negative consequences. The decisions about whether
and how to regulate nude dancing because of heightened crime
rates in neighboring communities provide a useful illustra285
tion. While widespread agreement exists that crime is harmful, some legislators or judges might accept any action that
would reduce crime, while others might advocate or sustain
only limited restrictions (or no restrictions at all) to safeguard
freedom of expression. This valuation process necessarily works
from a moral framework—or at least a framework that reflects
nonempirical, abstract views about what is good for society.
Third, and perhaps most profoundly, moral judgments in286
form how judges and lawmakers define “harm.” As we have
seen, different moral philosophers can, with absolute conviction, deem the same act, such as sexual intimacy between
same-sex partners, to be either constitutive of or instrumental
in enhancing or destroying human goodness, the only difference
287
between them being their moral philosophical stances. Or, to
consider an example touched on in Lawrence, some would consider the denial of marriage rights to gay people to be grossly
injurious to the dignity of lesbians and gay men and the com288
munities in which they live. Others consider the prospect of
285. See supra notes 126–49 and accompanying text (discussing cases regulating nude dancing establishments).
286. As Professor Dworkin has observed in connection with his critique of
Lord Devlin’s position regarding the relationship between law and morality,
“[w]hat is shocking and wrong is not [Devlin’s] idea that the community’s morality counts, but his idea of what counts as the community’s morality.” See
Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 9, at 1001.
287. See supra notes 232–35, 249–51 and accompanying text; cf. Robert C.
Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (2003) (observing that the Court in Lawrence
“avoid[ed] inflammatory accusations of bigotry by acknowledging the ‘profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles’ that support
condemnation of ‘homosexual conduct as immoral’” (quoting Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003)).
288. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) (championing the legalization of marriage for lesbian and gay couples); Thomas
Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIANS, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAW 398 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (same); Mary C.
Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles
in the Nineties, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 63 (1991) (noting that marriage for same-sex
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same-sex couples’ marriages to represent one of the greatest
289
present dangers to civilization.
But the influence of moral judgment is not limited to assessments of nonmaterial harms. Even determinations that
concrete injuries amount to cognizable harms to others are, ultimately, informed by judgments about what harm means. Earlier, in the Introduction, I offered the example of a pie-throwing
incident, which could be considered either harmful or not depending on one’s definition of harm. Many other weightier examples could be analyzed similarly. Consider, for example, the
use of race discrimination to sustain apartheid, the facilitation
of murder to preserve a family’s honor, and the imposition of
the death penalty as a form of deterrence and retribution. By
some, these actions are considered to be profound harms that
endanger both individuals and society; to others, these same
acts are essential to preserving individual and societal well290
being. Thus, no matter how carefully we might disavow moral
couples will lead to greater societal acceptance of homosexuality).
In Lawrence, the majority never mentioned marriage directly, commenting instead that the case did not “involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”
Lawrence, 123 U.S. at 2484. Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia, in their respective opinions, each addressed specifically the relationship of Lawrence to
marriage rights for same-sex couples. See id. at 2488 (suggesting that reasons
other than morality “exist to promote the institution of marriage”) (O’Connor,
J., concurring); id. at 2495–96 (urging that morality supplies a sufficient justification to support “laws refusing to recognize homosexual marriage”) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
289. See, e.g., James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why
Same-Sex Marriage Is Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY.
L. REV. 521, 522 (2002) (noting that conservatives’ position on marriage rights
for same-sex couples “inevitably leads to predications of apocalyptic cries
warning of ‘death of marriage and civilization itself’” (quoting E.J. GRAFF,
WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 32 (1999))); Wendy Herdlein, Something Old, Something New: Does the Massachusetts Constitution Provide for Same-Sex “Marriage”?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 181 (2002) (characterizing the recent Massachusetts same-sex marriage decision as “judicial tyranny”); Molly
McDonough, Gay Marriage Decision Harks Back 55 Years, ABA J. E-REPORT,
Nov. 21, 2003 (observing that opponents of marriage for lesbians and gay men,
including President George W. Bush, were extremely critical of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling that marriage restrictions based on sex
violated the state’s constitution in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,
798
N.E.2d
941
(2003)),
at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/
nov21marry.html.
290. For general discussion of differing viewpoints on these issues, see, respectively, DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); Rachel A. Ruane,
Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women in Jordan and Pakistan, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1523, 1527–28, 1528 n.30 (2000); LOUIS P.
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judgments in light of the challenges they present for adjudicators, they are inextricably bound up in our lawmaking and, as a
result, inevitably present in our adjudication as well.
V. CONCLUSION: A TENTATIVE PROPOSAL
TO RELIEVE MORAL DISCOMFORT
The Court’s reluctance to engage with morals justifications
coupled with the unavoidable presence of moral judgments in
lawmaking leave us with a final question: How can courts best
ensure that morals rationales will not be misused, given the
difficulty inherent in distinguishing legitimate moral sentiment
from impermissible bias? The previous sections suggest at least
one proposal for minimizing judicial moral discomfort that I
will develop and analyze here.
To recap the problems with judicial reliance on morals justifications, we saw earlier that the equal protection and due
process guarantees require courts to ensure that moral justifications are not being proffered to cover up impermissible government interests. By presuming morals rationales to be legitimate because they have received popular approval, a court
may fail to uncover invidious bias. But a court that does not
presume majoritarian moral sentiment to be legitimate risks
appearing to substitute its moral judgment for that of the people. The diversity of available moral positions makes it
virtually impossible for a court that doubts the majority’s moral
aims to demonstrate that it has discerned the correct moral position from among all others. That moral philosophers cannot
persuade each other to agree on a single moral code underscores further the implausibility of a court ever credibly making the case that it has found the moral answer.
Still, courts select regularly among competing analyses of
291
situations proffered by experts and lay witnesses, so the diversity of moral philosophical positions and popular views regarding a particular moral stance should not in itself create an
insurmountable barrier to successful review.
The challenge for courts, then, stems not so much from the
existence of competing expert or lay views as from judges’ inability to point to an external source—i.e., something other

POJMAN & JEFFREY REIMAN, THE DEATH PENALTY: FOR AND AGAINST (1998).
291. See generally Edward K. Cheng, Changing Scientific Evidence, 88
MINN. L. REV. 315 (2003) (discussing the difficulties faced by courts in analyzing evolving scientific evidence).
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than personal preferences—to justify the selection of a particular moral framework. In contrast to the ordinary situation,
where fact-finding is used to justify judicial decision making,
factual assessment is irrelevant to weighing the legitimacy of
an abstract, nonconsequentialist moral prohibition. Yet without
factual references, a court has little to demonstrate that its
evaluation of a morals justification reflects objective, reasoned
judgment rather than deference to its own views or to the likes
and dislikes of those who dominate the lawmaking process.
So, for example, if a government maintains that moral concerns justify a prohibition against particular sexual conduct, as
in Lawrence, no evidence can be taken to address meaningfully
the existence of that moral position. A court deciding a challenge to that law must instead attempt to develop a moral philosophical analysis that avoids the Scylla of unquestioning deference to majoritarian preferences and the Charybdis of
imposing its own moral views without the benefit of empirical
evidence to guide its course.
This sort of philosophical tightrope walking is not a task
for which courts, which are structured to elicit facts and interpret and apply relevant law, are institutionally well suited. Indeed, Georgia defended its sodomy law in Bowers in part based
on this institutional competence theory, arguing that “[t]he legislative process is acutely designed for [the purpose of assessing
societal values and morality] whereas the judiciary may be inclined to make determinations based upon more empirical evi292
dence, to which this area is not particularly amenable.”
Because the absence of factual grounding seems to be at
the root of the Court’s difficulties in evaluating morals rationales, a requirement that fact-based rationales exist to explain
government action could represent an important step, albeit a
partial one, toward a solution. In particular, if governments are
limited to adopting laws and policies that can be justified by
reference to observable or otherwise demonstrable harms, the
tension that arises from courts being asked to analyze justifications in the absence of evidence, such as morals rationales, will
293
be mitigated.
292. Petitioner’s Brief at 36, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No.
85-140).
293. Even if government action gives effect to moral aims (or other abstract
norms, such as decency or disgust), the presence of a factual justification in
addition to a purely morals-based rationale would enable a court to make a
meaningful evaluation of the fact-based interest.
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As an example, consider the way a fact-based evaluation
might proceed with respect to the highly contested regulation of
294
marijuana.
If government prohibits people from smoking
marijuana, evidence could be introduced regarding potential
295
health-related harms caused by that activity. Debate could
ensue between the parties or among members of a judicial
panel regarding whether marijuana actually causes the alleged
296
harm. Debate also could take place as to whether the government’s action in this instance responds appropriately to the
297
identified harm. Although there will likely be disagreement,
whatever the outcome, a court’s acceptance of a particular set
of facts can be studied and critiqued in a way that a court’s embrace of an abstract moral norm cannot.
Likewise, in Romer, the Court considered, as a factual matter, the validity of Colorado’s proffered justification that the
state constitutional ban on antidiscrimination protections for
gay people would save limited resources or protect individuals’
298
associational rights. It was then able to reach the empirically
supportable conclusion that the connection between the
294. See, e.g., Suzanne D. McGuire, Comment, Medical Marijuana: State
Law Undermines Federal Marijuana Policy—Is the Establishment Going to
Pot?, 7 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 73, 73 (1997) (“Availability of medical
marijuana . . . remains . . . the subject of heated debate at the federal level,
both in the legislature and with administrative agencies. . . . [V]arious state
legislatures, courts and voters have moved toward easier availability of marijuana for medicinal use.”); see also Joel Stein, The New Politics of Pot, TIME,
Nov. 4, 2002, at 57 (reporting on the heated debate on the legalization of marijuana that rages in social, political, and legal fora).
295. See, e.g., LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. & JAMES B. BAKALAR,
MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 3–4 (1993) (describing the historical
development of therapeutic and other uses of marijuana); Jerome P. Kassirer,
M.D., Federal Foolishness and Marijuana, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 366, 366–67
(1997) (arguing that federal policy prohibiting marijuana use is absurd in light
of the medical benefits of marijuana); Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy: A Smorgasbord of Conundrums Spiced by Emotions Around Children and Violence, 31
VAL. U. L. REV. 597, 622 (1997) (detailing the modern trend of criminalizing
marijuana); cf. John Cloud, Is Pot Good for You?, TIME, Nov. 4, 2002, at 62
(providing support that marijuana, despite potentially providing relief on certain illnesses, is nevertheless unhealthy, but only mildly so).
296. See, e.g., GLEN HANSON ET AL., DRUGS AND SOCIETY 377 (6th ed. 2001)
(discussing negative effects of marijuana use); GARY J. MILLER, DRUGS AND
THE LAW: DETECTION, RECOGNITION, & INVESTIGATION 409–11 (1992) (same);
John P. Walters, The Myth of “Harmless” Marijuana, WASH. POST, May 1,
2002, at A25.
297. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 294, at 57 (reflecting polls demonstrating
that the overwhelming majority of Americans would legalize marijuana for
medical purposes and penalize recreational use with, at most, a fine).
298. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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amendment and the aims was too attenuated to accomplish ei299
ther goal in a nonarbitrary fashion. In contrast, had the
Court decided the case based on the morality justification offered for the Colorado amendment, it would not have needed to
disclose its reasoning because current doctrine simply presumes the legitimacy of a morals rationale.
To be sure, the proposal would not fully resolve the difficulty inherent in judicial review of government action based on
composite or embedded moral concerns. Indeed, some would argue, empirical evidence can always be marshaled to veil a morals rationale. In addition, as discussed in Part IV, above, both
conscious and unconscious biases can shape a court’s response
300
to factual, as well as morals-based, justifications. Further
still, courts may, whether out of bias or deference to the legislative branch, accept highly speculative arguments about factual
harms and thereby render the empirical grounding requirement useless.
These limitations are illustrated well by two of the first
post-Lawrence cases to address governmental discrimination
based on sexual orientation. In Lofton v. Secretary of the De301
partment of Children & Family Service, the 11th Circuit sustained Florida’s ban on adoption by lesbians and gay men and
accepted as a rational basis for the law the argument that heterosexuals are better situated to provide a stable, nurturing
environment for the education of adopted children than lesbi302
ans and gay men. Yet, the preference for heterosexual parents, when examined closely, does not appear to rest on any
factual considerations other than that heterosexuals can, presumably, provide post-puberty guidance to their children re303
garding heterosexual relationships. If it was not otherwise
299. Id.
300. For discussion of these biases in the context of race discrimination, see
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
301. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 2004 WL
161275 (11th Cir. 2003).
302. Id. at *11.
303. Id. at *14. Related to this point, the Court highlighted the historical
acceptance of parenthood within marriage of a man and a woman, writing:
Although social theorists from Plato to Simone de Beauvoir have proposed alternative child-rearing arrangements, none has proven as enduring as the marital family structure, nor has the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human experience discovered a superior
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apparent, the inability of these purported factual justifications
to explain meaningfully the state’s line-drawing becomes particularly clear when the state’s ban on adoption by lesbian and
gay parents is considered within the overall framework of the
state’s adoption law, which permits adoption by unmarried heterosexual individuals and permits foster parenting by lesbians
304
and gay men. Notwithstanding the thinness of the factual
grounds, the Court upheld Florida’s ban under an analysis consistent with the one proposed here, suggesting that the empirical support requirement may not provide a meaningful constraint.
Similarly, in State v. Limon, the Kansas Court of Appeals
upheld a state law that subjected the defendant to a seventeenyear sentence rather than a fifteen-month sentence because he
had consensual oral sex with a fourteen-year-old boy rather
305
than a girl of the same age. As in Lofton, the justifications accepted by the Court amounted to factual characterizations of
normative preferences for heterosexuality. For example, the
Court found the differential punishment to be “rationally related to the purpose of protecting and preserving the traditional sexual mores of society and the historical sexual devel306
opment of children.” Although that rationale described the
criminal law’s preference for heterosexuality, it did not explain
why heterosexuality was preferable, as equal protection re307
quires.
Indeed, the justifications accepted in Limon and Lofton are
reminiscent of the fact-based justification rejected by the Su308
preme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti. There, a white father had
model. Against this “sum of experience,” it is rational for Florida to
conclude that it is in the best interests of adoptive children, many of
whom come from troubled and unstable backgrounds, to be placed in
a home anchored by both a father and a mother.
See id. at *11 (internal citations omitted).
304. Id. at *13–15.
305. 2004 WL 177649 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
306. Id. at *7.
307. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we
insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained.”); see also State v. Limon, 2004 WL 177649, *20 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2004) (Pierron, J., dissenting) (“Legislative disapproval of homosexuality
alone is not enough to justify any measures the legislature might choose to express its disapproval. . . . A rational basis must be rational and supported by a
reasonable cause and effect relationship to qualify.”).
308. 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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argued for transferring custody of his daughter to him because
of his former wife’s relationship with an African-American
man. The Court considered the factually grounded concern that
the child would be subjected to heightened pressures as a result
309
of her mother’s interracial relationship but ultimately rejected it. “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,”
the Court wrote, “but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
310
them effect.” Although Palmore involved a racial classifica311
tion and received higher scrutiny than the sexual orientation–based classifications in Lofton and Limon, under rational
basis review it is also well settled that courts cannot give effect
to prejudice, even when those prejudices are expressed in fac312
tual rather than moral or other abstract terms.
While the factual grounding requirement would not forbid
judicial acceptance of the types of justifications accepted in
Lofton and Limon (and rejected in Palmore), the proposed
framework still would be preferable to the current approach because it demands at least some analysis rather than according
carte blanche any time the government justifies its actions in
terms of morality. Because fact-based reasoning, as opposed to
moral philosophical arguments, tends to be publicly accessible,
a court potentially will be exposed to greater scrutiny—and
313
greater criticism—by both dissenting judges and the general
public if it accepts dubious facts to allow a traditional moral
314
regulation to survive. This, in turn, may have a constraining
309. Id. at 433 (“It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic
prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been
eliminated. There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different
race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present if the
child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin.”).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 432–33.
312. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
313. For example, Judge Pierron’s dissent in Limon considered and rejected the factually framed justifications for the state’s differential criminal
punishment of same-sex and different-sex sexual relations between eighteenyear-olds and fourteen-year-olds. See, e.g., State v. Limon, 2004 WL 177649,
*20–22 (2004) (Pierron, J., dissenting) (considering justifications related to
pregnancy, marriage and venereal diseases and concluding that “[t]he purpose
of the law is not to accomplish any of the stated aims other than to punish
homosexuals more severely than heterosexuals for doing the same admittedly
criminal acts”).
314. Though the factual grounding requirement could be strengthened to
address the problem of facts as well as abstract rationales being used to cover
impermissibly biased aims, ordinary rational basis review should, at least in
theory, require meaningful legitimate explanations for government action. See
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effect on courts otherwise inclined to accept nonlegitimate or
nonexplanatory morals rationales.
Finally, some will reject the proposal as reflecting values
inconsistent with their preferred method of governance. Libertarians, for example, would likely find the requirement that
government can act in response to empirically demonstrable
harms to be insufficiently restrictive. As proposed here, the
standard does not limit government action to harms to others
but rather would allow government to address all harms, including harms to self, that are capable of factual demonstration. For example, to the extent research demonstrated physical harms flowing from marijuana use, as in the example
above, government conceivably could regulate on that basis,
even if the use was purely personal and in the home.
Others will find the proposal to limit reliance on moralsbased rationales undesirable because they view morality as not
only sufficient but also an important independent basis for
315
lawmaking. Still others may find the proposal impractical because they see moral judgments as so fundamentally intertwined with the most concrete- and practical-seeming harms so
as to render empirical and morals rationales analytically

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (describing the need for rational
connection between the classification and the justification offered for it, even
under the lowest level of review); cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) (contrasting the weak and strong versions
of rational basis review).
A related concern about the factual evidence requirement would be that it
might heighten the otherwise weak burden on governments defending measures that do not make suspect classifications or infringe fundamental rights.
However, the requirement does not mandate the introduction at trial admissible evidence amounting to conclusive proof of the need for the regulation. Instead, whether proffered by the government or identified by the court itself,
the facts considered for purpose of rational basis review would need to illustrate only that the government could reasonably conceive that its act would
serve a legitimate government interest. Cf. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–
21 (1993) (“A statute is presumed constitutional and ‘[t]he burden is on the
one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis
which might support it,’ whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.” (internal citation omitted)). This analytic framework provides a meaningful opportunity for courts to fulfill their responsibility under rational basis
review rather than taking entirely on faith the government’s morals-based defense of its actions. An abstract rationale like morality would not suffice because without a minimal empirical grounding, a court cannot perform the
most basic function of assessing whether the government’s acts are reasonable
or wholly arbitrary.
315. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 9; Finnis, supra note 9.

GOLDBERG.3FMT

2004]

4·18·2004 3:17 PM

MORALS-BASED LAWMAKING
316

1311

indistinguishable.
From whatever vantage point, however, the institutionalcompetence question posed here can no longer be sidestepped
with a paean to lawmakers’ traditional powers to forbid actions
contra bonos mores. Whatever one thinks of the propriety or
necessity of government action to protect the public’s morals,
the question of how to ensure that morality does not wind up
providing a benign cloak for invidious preferences must be answered. Although Bowers’s explicit embrace of a moral disapproval argument coupled with the Court’s staunch rhetorical
support for morals-based exercises of the police power long obscured this difficulty, Lawrence has now called the question.
Those who would defend morals-based lawmaking cannot
credibly avoid responding.

316. See, e.g., Dworkin, Lord Devlin, supra note 9.

